

# **INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION BULLETIN**

Published by the Interim Secretariat

## **DISCUSSION ON EUROCOMMUNISM**

**Spartacist  
Box 1377, G.P.O.  
New York, N.Y. 10001, U.S.A.**

**June 1978  
No. 9  
US \$3.50**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>page</u>
-Annotated Bibliography	3
<u>Trotsky on Stalinism in Capitalist Europe</u>	
-The Theory of Socialism in One Country as a Series of Social Patriotic Blunders, 1929	6
-The Comintern's Liquidation Congress, 23 August 1935	8
-A Fresh Lesson, After the Imperialist "Peace" at Munich, 10 October 1938	10
<u>Eurocommunist and ORO Positions</u>	
-Joint Declaration by the Italian Communist Party and the Communist Party of Spain, 12 July 1975	12
-Italy Cannot be Governed Without the PCI by Enrico Berlinguer, June 1976	15
-Interview with Giancarlo Pajetta, 11 July 1977	18
-In Reply to Eugenio Greco by Gerry Foley, 15 October 1977	20
-Eurocommunism: A New Crisis of World Stalinism by Eugenio Greco, August 1977	21
-The Bitter Fruit of Socialism in One Country by Ernest Mandel, September 1977	32
-"Eurocommunism" in Question by Daniel Bensaid, 7-8 January 1978	34
-Are the CPs Still Stalinist? by Filoche, 13 February 1978	38
-The Soviet Bureaucracy and the Stalinist Parties Defend the Status Quo in Europe by Lecaute, 2 April 1978	40
-Report to the National Committee of the SWP by Caroline Lund, 23 February 1978	42
-Tactics for Building a Unified Revolutionary Organisation by the NC of the IMG, 18 March 1978	44
-From the PCF's 22nd Congress to the Defeat of the Left by Jean Elleinstein, 13 and 14 April 1978	45

	<u>page</u>
-Report to the Central Committee of the PCF by Georges Marchais, 27 April 1978	49
-Things Can't Go on this Way in the Communist Party by Louis Althusser, 25-28 April 1978	52
-The Death Knell of Eurocommunism by Jorge Semprun, 30 April 1978	61

Contributions to the Discussion

-Notes on Eurocommunism by Joseph Seymour, 28 March 1978	63
-Notes on the Crisis of Stalinism by John Sharpe, 1 June 1978	67
-Draft Resolutions on Eurocommunism by Joseph Seymour, 4 June 1978	75
-Eurocommunism, Helsinki and Carter's "Human Rights" Crusade by Reuben Samuels, 4 June 1978	77
-Is Eurocommunism the End of European Stalinism? by Jan Norden, 5 June 1978	81

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHYDocuments

"Joint Declaration by the Italian Communist Party and Communist Party of Spain" (12 July 1975), Italian Communists, July-August 1975.  
A founding document of Eurocommunism.

"The P.C.I. and the P.S.I. for Agreement among Democratic and Anti-Fascist Forces in Portugal" (15 August 1975), Italian Communists, June-August 1975.  
The Italian CP's attempt to mediate between the Portuguese Communist and Socialist parties in the critical summer of 1975.

"Joint Declaration by the Italian Communist Party and the French Communist Party" (15 November 1975), Italian Communists, September-December 1975.  
A founding document of Eurocommunism.

"Declaration of the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe" (East Berlin, June 1976), World Marxist Review, August 1976.  
Generally regarded as a diplomatic compromise between the Soviet bureaucracy and the Eurocommunist forces.

Books

Carrillo, Santiago, Eurocommunism and the State (Westport, Conn., Lawrence Hill, 1978).  
Published in early 1977, it is the locus classicus of Eurocommunism to date.

Napolitano, Giorgio, The Italian Road to Socialism (Westport, Conn., Lawrence Hill, 1977).  
Lengthy interview in 1976 (with a supplementary one in mid-1977) with a leading Eurocommunist spokesman of the Italian CP. Interviewer is Eric Hobsbawm, British liberal Stalinist historian.

Articles

Althusser, Louis, "On the Twenty-Second Congress of the French Communist Party," New Left Review, No. 104, July-August 1977.  
Favorable commentary on the French CP's "Eurocommunist" Congress in January 1976 by a French left-critical Stalinist intellectual.

Andreyev, B., "Playing Up to Imperialist Anti-Soviet Propaganda," New Times [Moscow], 3 January 1978.  
A sharp Soviet attack on the Spanish CP leadership.

Claudin, Fernando, "The Split in the Spanish Communist Party," New Left Review, No. 70, November-December 1971.  
Good narrative account of the 1968-70 fight between Carrillo and Kremlin-loyalists by a former leading Spanish CP intellectual turned right-wing New Leftist.

Devlin, Kevin, "A New Crisis in European Communism," Problems of Communism, November-December 1968.

Account of the reactions of the West European CPs to the 1968 Czech events by an intelligent and knowledgeable analyst for Radio Free Europe.

Devlin, Kevin, "The Challenge of Eurocommunism," Problems of Communism, January-February 1977.

Major analytical article using the June 1976 East Berlin conference of European CPs as a focus.

Economist (19 November 1977), "Broken Hammer, Blunt Sickle."

Capsule analysis of the British CP's 35th ("Eurocommunist") Congress in November 1977.

Golsborough, James O., "Eurocommunism After Madrid," Foreign Affairs, July 1977.

Representative piece of liberal bourgeois journalism on the subject.

Italian Communists (April-June 1977), "Euro-communism, 'New Times,' and Us."

L'Unità editorial defending Carrillo from Soviet polemical attack (see below).

Kanapa, Jean, "A 'New Policy' of the French Communists?," Foreign Affairs, January 1977.

The French CP's leading foreign policy spokesman rebuts the accusation that its "Eurocommunist" policies are a tactical maneuver, arguing that the party has always stood for democracy and national independence.

Kim, H. N., "The Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party Under Kenji Miyamoto," World Politics, January 1976.

Study of the evolution of the important Asian "Eurocommunist" party by a bourgeois anti-communist academic who is probably CIA-connected.

Kim, H. N., "The Japanese Communist Party's Parliamentary Road," Problems of Communism, March-April 1977.

See above.

Kissinger, Henry, "The Communist Parties of Western Europe: Challenge to the West," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Fall 1977.

An authoritative statement of the hardline and skeptical attitude toward Eurocommunism.

La Malfa, Ugo, "Communism and Democracy in Italy," Foreign Affairs, April 1978.

A prominent right-center Italian bourgeois politician, head of the small Republican Party, argues for accepting the "historic compromise."

Mandel, Ernest, "Three Facets of 'Euro-Communism'," Intercontinental Press, 23 May 1977.

The central statement on Eurocommunism by the USec majority.

Mujal-Leon, Eusebio, "Spanish Communism in the 1970's," Problems of Communism, March-April 1975.

Useful narrative account in the CIA's house organ.

New Times [Moscow] (June 1977, No. 26), "Contrary to the Interests of Peace and Socialism in Europe."

The main Soviet polemic against Carrillo's Eurocommunism and the State.

Revel, Jean-François, "The Myths of Eurocommunism," Foreign Affairs, January 1978.

Debunking of Eurocommunism as a tactical maneuver by a French right-wing ideologue.

Segre, Sergio, "The 'Communist Question' in Italy," Foreign Affairs, July 1976.

Leading Italian CP spokesman presents the case for the "historic compromise" to an American audience.

#### Articles by Trotsky

In addition to the three excerpts from Trotsky reprinted in this bulletin, Trotsky touched on the same subject more briefly in the following essays:

"The Stalinist Turn," 7 September 1935, Writings, 1935-36, pp. 125-129.

"A Great Achievement," 30 August 1938, Writings, 1938-39, pp. 435-439.

"Progressive Paralysis," 29 July 1939, Writings, 1939-40, pp. 36-43.

--Seymour  
1 June 1978

THE THEORY OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY AS A  
SERIES OF SOCIAL PATRIOTIC BLUNDERS

By Leon Trotsky

[In Trotsky, The Third International After Lenin, 1929, pp. 71-73.]

Marxism has always taught the workers that even their struggle for higher wages and shorter hours cannot be successful unless waged as an international struggle. And now it suddenly appears that the ideal of the socialist society may be achieved with the national forces alone. This is a mortal blow to the International.

The invincible conviction that the fundamental class aim, even more so than the partial objectives, cannot be realized by national means or within national boundaries, constitutes the very heart of revolutionary internationalism. If, however, the ultimate aim is realizable within national boundaries through the efforts of a national proletariat, then the backbone of internationalism has been broken. The theory of the possibility of realizing socialism in one country destroys the inner connection between the patriotism of the victorious proletariat and the defeatism of the proletariat of the bourgeois countries. The proletariat of the advanced capitalist countries is still traveling on the road to power. How and in what manner it marches towards it depends entirely upon whether it considers the task of building the socialist society a national or an international task.

If it is at all possible to realize socialism in one country, then one can believe in that theory not only after but also before the conquest of power. If socialism can be realized within the national boundaries of backward Russia, then there is all the more reason to believe that it can be realized in advanced Germany. Tomorrow the leaders of the Communist Party of Germany will undertake to propound this theory. The draft program empowers them to do so. The day after tomorrow the French party will have its turn. It will be the beginning of the disintegration of the Comintern along the lines of social-patriotism. The communist party of any capitalist country, which will have become imbued with the idea that its particular country possesses the "necessary and sufficient" prerequisites for the independent construction of a "complete socialist society," will not differ in any substantial manner from the revolutionary social democracy which also did not begin with a Noske but which stumbled decisively on August 4, 1914, over this very same question.

When the statement is made that the very existence of the U.S.S.R. is a guarantee against social-patriotism because in relation to a workers' republic patriotism is a revolutionary duty, then in this one-sided application of a correct idea there is expressed national narrow-mindedness. Those who say so have in mind only the U.S.S.R., closing their eyes to the entire world proletariat. It is possible to lead the proletariat to the position of defeatism in relation to the bourgeois state only by means of an

international orientation in the program on this central question and by means of a ruthless rejection of the social-patriotic contraband which is masked as yet but which seeks to build a theoretical nest for itself in the program of Lenin's International.

It is not yet too late to return to the path of Marx and Lenin. It is this return that opens up the only conceivable road to progress. We address this criticism of the draft program to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, in order to make possible the realization of this turn in which salvation lies.



THE COMINTERN'S LIQUIDATION CONGRESS [excerpt]

by Leon Trotsky

[From Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1935-36, pp. 84-94.]

The first great imperialist war broke out when capitalism seemed at the peak of its powers, and parliamentarism an eternal regime. The reformism and patriotism of the Second International were supported on this foundation. War? But this is the last war.... Since then all the illusions, both the primary ones and the derivative ones, have blown away like smoke. The merciless character of our epoch, which has bared all contradictions to the root, lends an especially ominous character--and, it may be said, an especially shabby one--to the capitulation of the Comintern to those ideas and idols on which at the start of its existence it had declared a holy war.

Nothing now distinguishes the Communists from the Social Democrats except the traditional phraseology, which is not difficult to unlearn. Even now the Communist leaders are already not unsuccessfully picking up drawing-room language in their dealings with their allies on the right; the old reserve of curses is preserved only against opponents from the left. It would be no wonder if the united front is proclaimed the first step towards full organizational fusion of the parties of the Second and Third Internationals.

The obstacles in the way of this fusion are rooted not so much in ideas as in the apparatuses. In England, Belgium, Holland and the Scandinavian countries the sections of the Comintern are too insignificant for the reformist parties to consider themselves interested in experiments with a united front or in attempts at fusion. But where the forces are more evenly distributed, above all in France, the question of fusion is already being posed from both sides as a practical problem. Will it be decided in the immediate future? The programmatic and tactical differences of opinion have been reduced to a minimum since the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet pact; the Social Democrats promise to defend the Soviet Union, in exchange for which the Communists promise to defend the French Republic. In relation to war and national defense--and this is the basic problem of our epoch--the basis for unity is thereby present. But there remains the question of the traditions of the two closed bureaucratic apparatuses and of the material interests of a considerable number of people who are bound up with the apparatuses. Whether the united pressure of fascism and Moscow diplomacy will prove sufficiently strong to overcome this secondary but very considerable obstacle on the path of fusion, the future will show. In any case the Seventh Congress has openly and decisively proclaimed the need to unite with that very Social Democracy which Stalin a few years ago was calling the twin of fascism.

If we take the ideological and political development of the Comintern, leaving aside the question of its fate as an organization--the body goes on decaying long after the living soul has departed from it--we can say that the history of the Third Interna-

tional has found in the Seventh Congress its ultimate conclusion. Twenty-one years ago Lenin proclaimed the slogan of a break with reformism and patriotism. Since then, all the opportunist and intermediate, so-called centrist leaders have imputed to Lenin above all the guilt of sectarianism. One may consider Lenin right or wrong, but it cannot be disputed that it was precisely on the idea of the irreconcilability of the two basic tendencies in the workers movement that the Communist International was founded. The Seventh Congress has arrived at the conclusion that sectarianism was the source of all the subsequent great defeats of the proletariat. Stalin is thus correcting the historical "error" of Lenin, and correcting it radically: Lenin created the Communist International; Stalin is abolishing it.

It is, however, already possible to say that even the complete union of the two Internationals would in no way assure the unity of the working class. The principles of social patriotism exclude in advance the possibility of preserving international unity, especially in an epoch of approaching military clashes. But there will not prove to be unity even within national limits. At a new historical stage there will inevitably take place a new irreconcilable split in the workers organizations and a regrouping of their elements along two axes: opportunist and revolutionary. Even now, in almost all countries of the world, the banner of the Fourth International has already been raised. For the moment, of course, it is merely an affair of small vanguard groups. But anyone who knows the history of the workers movement will understand their symptomatic importance. This side of the question, however, goes beyond the limits of this article, the aim of which is to give a general evaluation of the Seventh Congress. We repeat again: it will go down in history as the liquidation congress.

--23 August 1935

A FRESH LESSON [excerpt]  
After the Imperialist "Peace" at Munich

by Leon Trotsky

[From Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1938-39, pp. 52-78.]

Communo-Chauvinism

The monstrous and rapid development of Soviet opportunism finds its explanation in causes analogous to those which, in the previous generation, led to the flowering of opportunism in capitalist countries, namely, the parasitism of the labor bureaucracy, which had successfully solved its "social question" on the basis of a rise of the productive forces in the USSR. But since the Soviet bureaucracy is incomparably more powerful than the labor bureaucracy in capitalist countries, and since the feeding-trough at its disposal is distinguished by its almost unlimited capacity, there is nothing astonishing in the fact that the Soviet variety of opportunism immediately assumed an especially perfidious and vile character.

As regards the ex-Comintern, its social basis, properly speaking, is of a twofold nature. On the one hand, it lives on the subsidies of the Kremlin, submits to the latter's commands, and, in this respect, every ex-Communist bureaucrat is the younger brother and subordinate of the Soviet bureaucrat. On the other hand, the various machines of the ex-Comintern feed from the same sources as the Social Democracy, that is, the superprofits of imperialism. The growth of the Communist parties in recent years, their infiltration into the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, their installation in the state machinery, the trade unions, parliaments, municipalities, etc., have strengthened in the extreme their dependence on national imperialism at the expense of their traditional dependence on the Kremlin.

Ten years ago it was predicted that the theory of socialism in one country must inevitably lead to the growth of nationalist tendencies in the sections of the Comintern. This prediction has become an obvious fact. But until recently, the chauvinism of the French, British, Belgian, Czechoslovak, American, and other Communist parties seemed to be, and to a certain extent was, a refracted image of the interests of Soviet diplomacy ("the defense of the USSR"). Today, we can predict with assurance the inception of a new stage. The growth of imperialist antagonisms, the obvious proximity of the war danger, and the equally obvious isolation of the USSR must unavoidably strengthen the centrifugal nationalist tendencies within the Comintern. Each one of its sections will begin to evolve a patriotic policy on its own account. Stalin has reconciled the Communist parties of imperialist democracies with their national bourgeoisies. This stage has now been passed. The Bonapartist procurer has played his role. Henceforth the Communo-chauvinists will have to worry about their own hides, whose interests by no means always coincide with the "defense of the USSR."

When the American Browder deemed it possible to declare before a senate committee that in case of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union his party would be found on the side of its passionately beloved fatherland, he himself might have possibly considered this statement as a simple stratagem. But in reality, Browder's answer is an unmistakable symptom of a change from a "Moscow" to a "national" orientation. The "stratagem" arose out of the necessity of adaptation to imperialist "patriotism." The cynical grossness of this stratagem (the turn from the "fatherland of the toilers" to the republic of the dollar) reveals the profound extent of degeneration that has occurred and the full extent of the dependence of the sections of the Comintern on the public opinion of the bourgeoisie.

Fifteen years of uninterrupted purges, degradation, and corruption have brought the bureaucracy of the ex-Comintern to such a degree of demoralization that it has become able and anxious to openly take into its hands the banner of social patriotism. The Stalinists (we shall soon have to say, the ex-Stalinists) have not, of course, set the Thames on fire. They have simply picked up the well-worn banalities of petty-bourgeois opportunism. But in propagating them, they have injected into them the frenzy of "revolutionary" parvenus, who have turned totalitarian slander, blackmail, and murder into normal methods of "defending democracy." As for the old classic reformists, washing their hands in innocence after every embarrassing situation, they have known how to use the support of the new recruits to chauvinism.

In that imperialist country which happens to be in the same camp with the USSR during the war (if any such is found), the section of the ex-Comintern will, naturally, "defend" Moscow. This defense, however, will be of no great value, for in such a country all parties will "defend" the USSR. (In order not to compromise itself with its imperialist ally, Moscow would probably order the Communist Party not to shout too loudly, and might possibly try to dissolve it altogether.) On the contrary, in countries of the hostile camp, i.e., precisely where Moscow will be in greatest need of defenders, the ex-Communist parties will be found completely on the side of their imperialist fatherland: this course will be infinitely less dangerous and far more profitable. The ruling Moscow clique will reap the just fruits of fifteen years' prostitution of the Comintern.

--10 October 1938

JOINT DECLARATION BY THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY  
AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SPAIN

[From The Italian Communists, July-August 1975.]

At a moment when the fall of the fascist dictatorships in Portugal and Greece and the lacerating crisis gripping the Franco regime in Spain concretely raise the possibility of making Europe a continent without fascist regimes, and for Spain as well, the outlook is for a regime of democracy and freedom, there is more pressing need for the working-class and democratic forces--both on the level of the individual countries and on the West European level, in the new conditions created by the positive advances made in the process of international detente--to indicate new orientations capable of promoting a coming-together of all the democratic forces for a policy of democratic and social renewal and for a positive way out of the deep crisis gripping the capitalist countries of Europe.

This crisis reveals the inability of capitalism to solve the general needs of development of society and the problems it is now facing, and to implement in all fields those deep-reaching structural reforms that alone can guarantee the progress of nations. It renders increasingly strident the conflict between a policy imposed by the monopoly groups and the big multinational companies and the need to find positive answers to the requirements of the broad popular masses for freedom, participation and economic, social and cultural progress. It is necessary and possible to find a positive way out of this crisis, developing the broadest possible convergence and agreements among the forces with which the working-class and democratic movement on the continent today identifies. This is also indispensable to defeat the attempts by certain capitalist groups to steer the crisis towards an openly reactionary, authoritarian outcome.

Conscious of this responsibility and moved by the will to do everything possible to promote such convergence and coming-together, the Italian and Spanish Communists solemnly declare that their conception of democratic advance to socialism, in peace and freedom, is not a tactical attitude, but a strategic conviction rising out of reflection on the experiences of the working-class movement as a whole and on the specific historical conditions of their respective countries, in the West European situation. The common task facing Communists and all the democratic forces is to work for the solution of the problems facing the broad popular masses and society as a whole in such a way as to give real satisfaction to those social needs and human values of freedom, justice and civilization which capitalism increasingly sacrifices and restricts.

The prospect of a socialist society today rises out of the reality of things and has as its premise the conviction that socialism can only be built in our countries by means of the development and full implementation of democracy. Underlying this is full recognition of the value of the individual and collective freedoms and their guarantee, the principles of the lay nature of the State and its democratic organization, the plurality of political parties in a system of free dialectics, autonomy of the trade unions, religious freedom, freedom of speech, culture, art and science. In the economic

field, a socialist solution must ensure a high level of productive development, by means of a policy of democratic planning that makes use of the coexistence of various forms of enterprise and public and private management.

On the basis of these convictions, which are a fundamental part of their political and theoretical conceptions, the Italian and Spanish Communists are working to achieve the broadest coming-together of all democratic political forces--for the restoration of democracy in Spain and for its development in Italy. This coming-together, with full respect for the personality and autonomy of each force, is the only road capable of opening a prospect of progress and freedom, of advancing the interests of the working class, peasant masses, middle classes and intellectuals, and creating a national unity of the forces of democracy and progress capable of isolating the forces of social conservatism and reaction. New political prospects, a new way of governing, based on the broadest possible participation by the popular and youth masses and their organizations, have become imperative.

On these issues, both in the individual countries and on the West European level--as already indicated by the Brussels Conference of the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries of Europe in January 1974--it is necessary and urgent to promote the broadest possible comparison of opinions and responsible search for points of convergence and agreement among all the political forces--Socialists, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Catholics, democrats and progressives--who want to find a common meeting ground for the great democratic potentialities of Western Europe in a policy of renewal and progress.

The development of international détente--which will shortly find new expression in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, for whose achievement a fundamental factor has been the meeting between the peace-oriented foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and the new realistic trends that have emerged in the Western capitals--eliminates old impediments and obstacles along this road. The problem is to grasp all the new possibilities, to ensure, also, that the countries of Western Europe and Western Europe as a whole will be capable of making their own original contribution to the building of an international society based on respect for the right of each individual people freely to choose the road of their own future, on the elimination of imbalances, on justice, progress, development and peace. A new West European policy, based on relations of friendship and cooperation, on a basis of equality, with all countries of the world, beginning with the United States and the Soviet Union, and on new relations with the developing countries, can make an irreplaceable contribution to the achievement of these great goals.

The Italian and Spanish Communists intend to intensify their efforts and initiatives in this direction, both in continental Europe and in the Mediterranean area. Restoration of democracy in Spain and development of democracy in Italy, together with the new processes characterizing life in many European countries, can give Western

Europe new impetus in solving the problems facing it, with a prospect of freedom, democracy, progress and peace.

The Italian and Spanish Communist Parties, which elaborate their internal and international policies in full autonomy and independence, are fully aware of their great national and European responsibilities. On the basis of these common visions, they will further develop in future their fraternal relations, which are marked by a long, solid friendship.

--12 July 1975

ITALY CANNOT BE GOVERNED WITHOUT THE PCI [excerpt]

by Enrico Berlinguer

[From an interview published in Corriere della Sera just before the 20-21 June 1976 Italian elections and reprinted in The Italian Communists, foreign bulletin of the PQI, April-July, 1976.]

Q. There is something else that makes people uneasy about you: your ties with the U.S.S.R.

A. Our autonomy is total. The P.C.I. decides its policies in absolute freedom. And it expresses completely autonomous judgments on the socialist experiences of other countries, also pointing out the aspects involving serious limitations of freedom. If we do not see everything black when we look to the East, as others do, this is simply a "different" judgment, not a "non-autonomous" judgment.

Q. But why, when you point out these "aspects," do you almost always do so on the back page of L'Unità? Your replies to Pravda or Isvestia on the question of pluralism are often invisible....

A. We have also made official statements and published front-page articles, if that's what bothers you. The fact is that the Soviet papers and journals have published a great many articles questioning our stand on pluralism.... And our replies have been many, repeated and motivated.

Q. Do you think that in the U.S.S.R. they consider Berlinguer a heretic when he talks about pluralism?

A. I don't know what they consider me. It seems to us, rather, that some people in the Soviet Union have not gone beyond a conception of Marxism as a closed body of principles, whose literal formulation should provide an answer to everything....

Q. If Brezhnev heard you say that, what would he think of you?

A. I can't imagine.

Q. Can I write that you don't even care to know?

A. Well, it's always important to know what others think. However, I can tell you that the day after my speech at the last C.P.S.U. Congress, in which I explicitly reaffirmed our line, I met Brezhnev and nothing was said about my speech. We talked about other things, namely the international situation....

Q. Will something have to change for private enterprise as well? You say that you intend to respect its existence, but at the same time you propose to move towards socialism. Isn't there a contradiction?

A. There's no contradiction. Let me try to explain in the simplest possible terms. First, contrary to what the Marxist classics forecast, a fabric of small and medium-sized businesses--industries,



artisan enterprises, merchants, peasant farms--has continued to exist. Particularly in Italy, this fabric has shown itself to be extremely important as concerns both development and employment. Second: total nationalization (as in Czechoslovakia in the 1950's, where everything was turned over to the State, even the barbershops) has turned out to be harmful. Third: in Italy, the public sector is already extensive. Mixed forms of public and private enterprise can also exist in a socialist society. Indeed, in an industrialized country like Italy, it is advantageous to maintain private enterprise from all points of view, and not only from the economic standpoint. The unifying element is provided by planning, which establishes the frame of reference within which both the public and private sector work. I want to repeat here that for us, socialism does not mean total socialization of the means of production.

Q. But what you're talking about is social democracy.

A. No, because the social-democratic societies are not moving towards the overcoming of capitalism. They haven't even succeeded in getting rid of the characteristic feature of today's capitalism, namely the big monopoly concentrations. And then socialism also means the assertion of new human values. In the social-democratic societies, despite the progress made in material well-being, all the negative aspects of capitalism still remain, such as alienation....

Q. Are you quite sure there isn't alienation in the U.S.S.R. too?

A. There may still be a form of alienation in the socialist societies too. The workers in these societies no longer feel exploited, but they do sense that they have not yet achieved full participation in what they are doing. Certainly, in the U.S.S.R., the workers and citizens do criticize and intervene at various levels in economic and social life. But I think debate and participation by the masses in the big choices is insufficient.

Q. A lot of people fear that if the P.C.I. gets in government, sooner or later, this participation in the big choices will be "insufficient" in Italy too. They fear that in the end you will transfer to the country the P.C.I.'s system of internal government, democratic centralism: a few decide and the others obey.

A. I don't think so. The Party is one thing, and, for the Party, democratic centralism is the system that guarantees the most efficiency and the most democracy: I don't think the system based on factions and patronage machines is more democratic. The country is something else. In Italian society, the system must remain the one set down by the Constitution: personal freedom and rights, representative democracy based on Parliament, party pluralism, proportional representation, the alternation of parties in power.

Q. You really sound like an "Italian Dubcek."...

A. I have great respect for Dubcek, but I don't think I resemble him. He has his temperament, I have mine.

Q. Dubcek may be different, but he was also overthrown by Soviet tanks. Do you think his political end was unjust?

A. Yes, it was undoubtedly unjust.

Q. Did you do everything you could to help him?

A. Yes, and also afterwards. We have never failed to criticize and intervene. Unfortunately, an unarrestable logic had been set in motion.

Q. Don't you fear that Moscow will bring Berlinguer and his Eurocommunism to the same end as Dubcek and his "socialism with a human face"?

A. No. We are in another area of the world. There is not the slightest possibility that our road to socialism can be hindered or conditioned by the U.S.S.R., even presuming that it wants to. One can argue as to whether the U.S.S.R. seeks to exert its hegemony over the countries that are its allies. But there is not one single act that indicates its intention to go beyond the boundaries set by Yalta.

Q. You therefore feel safer because you are in the West.

A. I feel that since Italy does not belong to the Warsaw Pact, from this point of view, there is absolute certainty that we can proceed along the Italian road to socialism without any constraints. But this does not mean that there are no problems within the Western bloc: indeed, we find ourselves forced to defend Italy's right to decide its own future within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, an alliance we do not question.

Q. In short, the Atlantic Alliance can also be a useful shield in order to build socialism with freedom.

A. I don't want Italy to withdraw from the Atlantic Pact, "also" for this reason, and not only because our withdrawal would upset the international equilibrium. I feel safer over here, but I see that also over here there are serious attempts to limit our autonomy.

Q. Anyway, don't you think that socialism with freedom is more achievable in the Western system than in the Eastern one?

A. Yes, certainly, the Western system offers fewer constraints. However, be careful. Over there, in the East, they would perhaps like to see us build socialism as they like it. But over here, in the West, some people don't even want to let us start to build it, even if we do so with freedom. I realize that it is a little risky on our part to pursue a road that is not always appreciated either over here or over there. This is one reason why I hope the Italians will encourage us on June 20. Our road, which is different from those followed to date, is the one that most closely corresponds to the country's deepest interests. And we are convinced that the conditions exist to pursue it with confidence.

INTERVIEW WITH GIANCARLO PAJETTA [excerpt]

[From an interview which appeared in Der Spiegel of 11 July 1977, immediately following a trip to Moscow by a top PCI delegation in the wake of the Soviet attacks on Santiago Carrillo.]

Spiegel: Mr. Pajetta, a week after the Soviet attack on Santiago Carrillo, Eurocommunist head of the Spanish CP, a PCI delegation led by you held talks in Moscow and raised the Carrillo case. Why this Soviet attack on the Secretary of the Spanish CP?

Pajetta: In his book, Carrillo harshly criticized the Soviet Union. The Soviet comrades told us that they wanted to reply just as harshly. Thus their answer is not aimed at the general policies of the Spanish CP, much less against other Communist Parties in the West.

Spiegel: Do you think that in condemning Carrillo Moscow is ultimately trying to form a second, pro-Soviet, CP in Spain?

Pajetta: The Comrades totally exclude that.

Spiegel: And yet, there was already one attempt, with the Lister group.

Pajetta: OK, but this group never went to Moscow and it never set up a real party. At the Berlin conference of the European CPs nobody demanded that the Lister group be recognized or invited to participate.

Spiegel: Concretely, what did you say to your Soviet interlocutors about the Carrillo case?

Pajetta: We expressed our concern about the tone and the meager argumentation of that unfortunate article in the Soviet journal New Times.... We noted that the Soviets wanted to limit the episode. But in the communiqué we stressed the problem of autonomy, because we believe that this new episode should serve to remind us of the principle of autonomy affirmed at the Berlin conference of the CPs.

Spiegel: In your communiqué you spoke of the "openness" of your Moscow talks. Isn't that simply an empty formula used in almost every communiqué? How harshly and clearly, for example, did you express your displeasure over the attack on Carrillo?

Pajetta: We stated that the magazine article against Carrillo was absolutely unacceptable. What more do you want?

Spiegel: In what respects is Carrillo's evaluation of the Soviet Union different from the PCI's?

Pajetta: In his book, Carrillo contests the socialist character of the Soviet system. We on the other hand believe that all systems, including the socialist system, are in a process of development. We do not say that socialism equals perfection and that where perfection is lacking there is no socialism. Like everything on earth, socialism can and must be continually improved.

Spiegel: In contrast to Carrillo you fully consider Soviet society to be socialist?

Pajetta: Yes, of course, even though there are still features there which we consider anti-liberal. For what determines a socialist society is how the means of production are divided and how the class problem is resolved.

Spiegel: Eurocommunists always emphasize that socialism and pluralistic democracy go together. But up until now only Carrillo has dared draw the conclusion in his evaluation of the USSR: since there are no democratic freedoms in the USSR, therefore the Soviet Union is not a socialist democracy but a dictatorship.

Pajetta: Whoever says that forgets that political structures are determined by historical development. What we have said about pluralism of parties applies to Western Europe. On the other hand the problem of freedom and democracy concerns all countries. Looking at the socialist states we believe that--precisely because they are growing so tempestuously--they will arrive at increasingly democratic institutions....

Spiegel: Many observers see a new schism in the communist world in the conflict between the Eurocommunists and the Soviets, above all in the Carrillo case.

Pajetta: In my view there has been only one schism in the communist movement: the Chinese--and that was already too many. I hope, because I am ecumenical-minded, that that split will also be reversed. Of course, one cannot return to the monolithism of the Third International. It was dissolved because it was no longer appropriate. We must strive to achieve unity in the communist movement without a "world capital," a unity which accepts differences....

Spiegel: What effect on the population in the Eastern bloc does the Eurocommunists' constant reference to democratic civil liberties have?

Pajetta: Unfortunately there is a lot of propaganda mixed up in that. Just think how the Americans use the civil rights question for propaganda.

Spiegel: Doesn't Eurocommunism encourage the civil rights groups in the Eastern bloc?

Pajetta: First of all, these movements in Eastern Europe don't represent any really relevant political forces. They are symptoms of discontent. We very much hope that the governments and parties in the East will make what they promise come true....

Spiegel: But doesn't the attack on Carrillo show that the Soviets still cling to their concept of one leading party?

Pajetta: You have to see the real dimensions of the conflict. Some of Carrillo's evaluations in his book are harsh and superficial. The Soviet response, that is, the New Times article, is most unfortunate. That's all.

IN REPLY TO EUGENIO GRECO [excerpt]

by Gerry Foley

[From an article, subtitled "Eurocommunism, Goldilocks, and the Three Bears" in Intercontinental Press, 5 December 1977.]

Greco's arbitrary approach has already apparently led him to flirt with positions that are really different from those of the rest of the Trotskyist movement and would lead him very far astray if he developed them consistently. He does this when he says that the Eurocommunist CPs' defense of the dissidents against bureaucratic repression promotes an "imperialist plan" against the workers states, and when he makes statements indicating that the Eurocommunist CPs are becoming a battering ram for imperialism against the economic underpinnings of these states.

Greco is not the first to advance these positions. Among those claiming to be Trotskyist, the award for originality goes to such sectarian groups as the Spartacist League in the United States and the Workers Revolutionary Party in Britain. Let us hope that Greco proves capable of seeing the deadly logic involved and that he draws back in time.

--15 October 1977

EUROCOMMUNISM: A NEW CRISIS OF WORLD STALINISM [excerpt]

By Eugenio Greco

[From Revista de America, No. 4, August 1977.]

"The Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party thinks that the time has come to eliminate from the relations between communist parties and workers parties the method of substituting excommunications and condemnations for scientific analyses.... Such methods form part of the reasons why the so-called 'existing socialism' in countries like the Soviet Union cannot serve as an ideal model of socialist society."

With these phrases the top leadership of the PCE rejected the virulent attack of Novoye Vremya (New Times), the Soviet weekly, against "Eurocommunism," and particularly against Santiago Carrillo for his book Eurocommunism and the State.

For his part, Manuel Azcárate, member of the PCE central committee, stated in the Yugoslav weekly, Nin:

"After 1968, we expelled the pro-Soviet Lister and Garcia faction. Today there are no such factions in our party and we think that there cannot be any. The time has long passed when Moscow had its own party in every country."

The process of the PCE is the most critical and acute in the dynamic of the split of various Communist parties known as "Eurocommunist," from Moscow's discipline. Azcárate's words, formulated as a question, form the axis of the diverse interpretations of this phenomenon. Is it true that the time is long gone when Moscow had its own party in every country? Other important questions arose around this central point. Is Eurocommunism a new or ancient phenomenon? Is it progressive or reactionary? Do the Eurocommunist parties become centrist or even revolutionary, or will they continue to be counterrevolutionary? Do they continue to be Stalinist or have they ceased to be Stalinist?...

Yugoslavia/China and Cuba: Two of Stalinism's First Crises

There is only one scientific definition of Stalinism--that being as the product of the bureaucratization of the Soviet workers state, of the Bolchevik party and of the international apparatus of both--the Third International. It is therefore above all an international phenomenon not simply the political activity of class collaboration and a monolithic and bureaucratic structure at the level of a national workers party. This world apparatus registers the impact of the rise and fall of the class struggle, as well as the consequences of the development--also a product of the class struggle--of apparatuses relatively or totally autonomous inside or outside of it....

If we had to point out periods in the crisis of Stalinism, we would note three: first, China and Yugoslavia's break with the

Soviet apparatus; second, the Cuban revolution, and third, the weakening of relations between the European CPs and the USSR bureaucracy.

The first crisis of Stalinism--i.e., China and Yugoslavia's break--has to do with the success of two national revolutions opposed to official Comintern policy. The Chinese CP "disobeyed" this policy when Mao continued his peasant guerrillaism until he liquidated Chiang Kai-shek against Stalin's orders. The Yugoslavs did it when Tito de facto repudiated the Yalta agreement--which included his country in western imperialism's sphere of influence--and overthrew the bourgeoisie, installing a workers state....

Tito's excommunication by the Soviet bureaucracy was simultaneous with the purges in the rest of Eastern Europe which produced, for example, the demise of Gomulka. Nevertheless, while the lack of autonomy of those countries' bureaucracies obligated them to accept the purges and submit themselves to Moscow's will--thus slowing down the process of construction of autonomous apparatuses--in Yugoslavia the break with world Stalinist apparatuses was underway. The same thing would later occur in China....

The Cuban process was an inverse one. In the first place because the July 26 Movement was not part of the Stalinist apparatus, but rather originated outside of it. In the second place, it began to crack the Stalinist apparatus--above all in Latin America--not as the result of the formation of an autonomous national bureaucracy, but on the contrary due to the proletarian internationalism of the Cubans and their interest in extending the revolution--which they directly reflected--to all of Latin America. Thirdly, it was due to the economic blockade, the growing economic dependency on the USSR, the failure of attempts to extend the revolution and the consequent rise of a bureaucracy inside the Cuban state. The Cubans capitulated to Moscow, going from being outside to becoming part of the Stalinist apparatus, and tried to reverse (without success) the crisis that they themselves had provoked. In essence the differences between the two processes lie in the fact that China and Yugoslavia's break with the Kremlin resulted in the formation of autonomous nationalist bureaucracies and apparatuses, while the confrontation between the Kremlin and Cuba was the clash of an internationalist leadership with the nationalist bureaucracy of the USSR. And the later capitulation of the Cuban leadership is a result of its inability to create an autonomous apparatus due to the exceptionally unfavorable conditions that Cuba was undergoing, and consequently due to its financial and economic dependency on the USSR. Nevertheless, despite the differences that have been pointed out, the three processes have a similar basis: the rise of revolutionary mass struggle, more concretely the taking of power due to the impact of revolutionary mobilization of the masses in the three countries.

Eurocommunism: A By-product of the Rise of '68

Livio Maitan, in his "Theories and Mystifications of Eurocommunism" (Inprecor, 7 July 1977), maintains that "the political and

theoretical evolution which led the most important Communist parties of the capitalist countries to 'Eurocommunism' began more than 20 years ago, and thus in various respects goes straight back to 1935-36." With this definition Maitan makes an error which we will frequently encounter in other authors: not including the dynamic toward a new crisis and split of the world Stalinist apparatus as an essential trait of Eurocommunism. If he did so, he could hardly claim that the evolution of CPs toward Eurocommunism began more than 20 years ago. Let us simply remember that 21 years ago the Soviet invasion of Hungary took place to cut down the anti-bureaucratic workers rebellion by fire and sword, and that invasion had the support of the Eurocommunist parties who 12 years later would come out against a similar action in Czechoslovakia. He would be even more hard put to speak of splits--or even timid attempts at a split--with the Comintern on the part of the CPs in 1935-36.

For us the present Eurocommunist phenomenon has a profound basic similarity with the previous crises of world Stalinism: it is the product of the European upsurge which began in 1968. It presents an important difference: it is not the result of the taking of power in any country, but rather is due to the formation of strong apparatuses with a certain degree of autonomy on the part of the big mass communist parties.

The first party to show its tendency toward autonomy from the Soviet apparatus was the Italian CP. In this it differed from the French CP, which was extremely loyal to the Moscow line. The same was true of the party structure: while the PCF was absolutely bureaucratic in its internal regime, the PCI was more sensitive to pressures from the ranks. A good illustration of these differences can be seen in the different policies of the two parties faced with the bonapartist plans of the French and Italian bourgeoisie in the immediate postwar period. While the PCF leadership supported the Third Republic and formed part of the first Gaullist government, the PCI leadership, initially inclined toward backing the monarchical solution, was obliged to retreat before the angry protest of its ranks.

The explanation for the greater autonomy and "democracy" of the PCI lies in the fact that fascism prevented the Italian Communists from building a solid apparatus directly tied to the Soviet one like the PCF. Nevertheless in the struggle against fascism and in the resistance, the PCI transformed itself into the largest western Communist Party, with much greater mass influence than the PCF. This made possible the creation of their own trade-union, cooperative, cultural, etc., apparatuses, which to a large extent depended on that mass support; and on the other hand, by becoming a large electoral party, the PCI was obliged in seeking votes to maneuver and make concessions to its base, to take into account the aspirations of the masses, to compete with other parties on this terrain (PSI and Christian Democrats)--in essence to adopt more democratic postulates and internal norms of functioning, as a concession to precisely the democratic consciousness of the Italian and European proletariat in general.



The difference between the PCI and the PCF is therefore to be found in the difference between a party and a bureaucracy that has its own apparatus and depends upon mass support to maintain them; and on the other hand, one which financially depends on the Stalinist center. That is precisely why it was the PCI which more rapidly tended to distance itself from Moscow, while the PCF--which also reflected the national and mass pressures, although in a more mediated sense--embarked on the same process at a much slower pace.

In 1968 two decisive events took place to bring forth Eurocommunism: the upsurge initiated by the French May events which immediately extended to Italy and other European countries, and the Red Army invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet atrocity in Czechoslovakia was repudiated by the working and popular masses all over Europe. And for the first time in history, some CPs in Europe came out and publicly disagreed with the Kremlin. The French joined the PCI. Furthermore, it was precisely this event which produced the Spanish CP's turn to the Eurocommunist line, with the consequent expulsion of the pro-Soviet Lister wing.

But if the invasion of Czechoslovakia brought about the most spectacular manifestation of a rift between Moscow and the future Eurocommunists, the decisive fact which caused it in reality was the mass upsurge beginning in 1968. This upsurge subjected the CPs, for the first time after decades of social peace, to pressure from the workers and popular movement. In the second place it produced a notable development of its electoral possibilities, forcing them to take into account the desires of the masses. In the third place, it required them to negotiate directly with the bourgeoisies in their respective countries, without the need of Kremlin mediation. Finally the same European bourgeoisies--or at least important sectors of them--encouraged a process of "westernization" of the CPs which would permit them to negotiate with the CP in the same cordial relations which they had maintained with the social-democratic parties for decades.

These consequences of the upsurge in Europe in turn combined with two fundamental elements: the manifestations of the political revolution in the workers states (resistance to the Red Army in Czechoslovakia, the Polish workers' strikes, etc.); and the influence inside the CPs of those sectors of the privileged workers which grew out of the European economic boom, and which bring with them their share of nationalism. In the last analysis, this combination explains the new dynamic of the European CPs.

#### Eurocommunism Equals the Social-Democratization of the CPs

In essence this new dynamic represents the oscillation of the European CPs between the orbit of the Stalinist apparatus and the direct link, without intermediaries, to the European bourgeoisies and world imperialism.

The CPs are pressured by two forces: on the one hand, their structural dependency, fundamentally financial and in general of

their apparatus, on the Soviet bureaucracy and its world apparatus, i.e., on Stalinism; on the other hand, the weight of their own apparatus and its relations with the national workers movement (and in particular its privileged sectors), and their growing role (during the upsurge) as intermediaries between the latter and the national imperialist bourgeoisies of their respective countries. That is why we define Eurocommunism as a process of social-democratization of the CPs, i.e., as having a tendency to play the same role as the socialist parties of the Second International; to cease being direct agents in the workers movement of the Stalinist bureaucratic apparatus--and only by means of this intermediary indirect agents of the imperialist bourgeoisie--to become the direct agents of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

This characterization implies that any progress of the Eurocommunist parties toward centrist positions, much less revolutionary ones, is excluded. In reality, there do not exist between Stalinism and social democracy differences of an ideological, programmatic nor general political character, given that they present a fundamental counterrevolutionary agreement: class collaboration. The difference lies in whether this is indirect--by way of Moscow--or directly with the imperialist bourgeoisie. But that does not make up the content of Stalinist and social-democratic strategy, but rather the form and the mediations through which these are carried out.

The discussion on the limits to which the process of social-democratization has gone at this time has no relevant importance. If we were in a period of war, or even one of cold war between the Soviet Union and imperialism, the alignments in one or another camp would have an important meaning, because a question of principles would come into play: the defense or non-defense of the Soviet Union as a workers state against the world bourgeoisie. But in the present period of "peaceful co-existence" and "detente"--that is, a counterrevolutionary pact on an international scale between the Soviet bureaucracy and imperialism--the degree which the process of social-democratization of the CPs may have reached does not alter, in its essence, the objective political role they play: agents of the bourgeoisie, direct or indirect, inside the workers movement, with a treacherous and counterrevolutionary policy of class collaboration.

Having pointed out the limited importance of defining this matter, we will nonetheless give our opinion. We believe that the European CPs still basically depend on the Moscow apparatus. They continue to be Stalinist but they show a tendency toward a split with Stalinism. The party which has come closest to a break, and has probably already arrived at one, is the Spanish CP. The remaining parties, although they haven't taken the qualitative step to a point of no return, will continue to embark upon an inevitable dynamic toward split. Insofar as their apparatuses continue to strengthen themselves and gain more and more autonomy, they will broaden their ties with the imperialist bourgeoisie. They will be able to maneuver more and more as a result of the upsurge, particularly the workers upsurge in the USSR and the other workers states,

thus highlighting the deterioration of the world Stalinist apparatus. All of these factors are combining and will combine even more in the future, in order to take the Eurocommunist process to its inevitable end: the social-democratization of the CPs....

Carter, Eurocommunism and the Soviet Bureaucracy

To understand the question of Eurocommunism in all its aspects, however, it is not enough to refer to the relations of the European CPs to the Soviet bureaucracy and to the workers movement and the bourgeoisie of their countries. It is also necessary to integrate into the analysis a determining element: the policy of Yankee imperialism, today synthesized in the so-called "Carter plan." In her article "Carter Plan: Another Counterrevolutionary Policy" (Revista de America, No. 3) Marcela Rodriguez labeled the new imperialist strategy "a battering ram directed at the workers states"....

Finally, Rodriguez points out that Yankee imperialism's raising of the human rights banner in the workers states, and its encouragement of those opposed to the bureaucracy, is an important part of this imperialist plan against the workers states.

These considerations that we hold locate Eurocommunism--i.e., the process of social-democratization of the CPs--in a wider dimension. It has to do with both faces of the imperialist plan; with establishing direct ties to itself in order to guarantee democracy for counterrevolutionary governments of the Soares type, in order to contain the rise of the European working-class movement. And it will necessarily involve--insofar as this dynamic becomes deeply rooted and produces a qualitative leap toward a break with the Stalinist world apparatus--a plan to detonate crises in the workers states once they develop internally the social contradictions derived from "free commerce" with the capitalist world.

In this second respect, the position of the European CPs of support to Soviet dissidents, without overlooking its positive aspects, helps to reinforce the capitalist plan. Mandel sees in this support to Soviet dissidents one of the fundamental causes of friction between the Eurocommunist parties and the Stalinist apparatus. Thus in his article, "Three Facets of 'Eurocommunism'" (Inprecor, No. 5 [also in Intercontinental Press, 23 May 1977]) he states:

"But much more important than this uneasiness on the part of the Soviet bureaucracy about the future relations of the 'Eurocommunists' with the Soviet Union and the 'socialist camp' is the fear and hostility of the Kremlin in regard to the timid criticisms the 'Eurocommunists' have made of the worst excesses of bureaucratic repression....

"Either the Kremlin has to explain that the largest Communist parties in the capitalist world have crossed over to the camp of imperialism, or it must recognize that there are alternatives to the Stalinist and post-Stalinist model of power from the standpoint of the working class. Either

option would undermine the Kremlin's political authority and clearly broaden the maneuvering room of the opposition in the USSR and the 'People's Democracies'."

We believe that Mandel's observation is brilliant but one-sided. He forgets other aspects of the Eurocommunists' policies that are akin to the imperialist plan. Carrillo's position of a Europe that will be "neither in NATO nor in the Warsaw Pact," and that of Berlinguer favorable to a "united Europe"--aren't these the first step toward a future campaign for free commercial relations between the Eastern European countries and, at a minimum, the European imperialist powers? Isn't it because the Soviet bureaucracy or sectors of it perceive this danger that the tensions with the Eurocommunist parties are so extreme?...

Is a Break of the CPs with Stalinism Impossible?

Jack Barnes in his report, "Europe vs. America and the Erosion of World Stalinism," categorically assures us that a break by the European CPs with Stalinism is impossible.

"After Stalinist parties consciously foster and promote social patriotism as an adjunct to Soviet foreign policy, they lose a layer of trade-union functionaries, municipal counselors, a wing of the party when they try to swing back....

"But they lose individuals, sometimes a large number--not parties. They lose trade unionists, they lose elected officials, they lose functionaries in foreign trade corporations and paid full timers in sections of the mass movement, but they don't lose parties."

Leaving no room for doubt, Barnes insists:

"What Kissinger understands is that if there were a sudden shift tomorrow in world politics, if American imperialism took the offensive...the CPs in Italy and France... would react on behalf of the Soviet Union."

For Barnes, the differences between the Eurocommunist parties and the Kremlin are differences of language and tactics, and in no way point to a profound dynamic toward a break.

"As Adam B. Ulam commented...Brezhnev did 'not seem unduly perturbed by the new language employed by their Italian and French comrades.' In fact, Brezhnev 'obliquely endorsed the main drift of their tactics' by drawing attention to the successes of the popular-front approach.

"I think this is an accurate assessment. It is very much in the interests of the aims of the Soviet bureaucracy."

Consequently for Barnes there exist no basic differences between the parties which servilely submit to the world Stalinist apparatus and the Eurocommunist parties:

"The Kremlin would trade a servile Gus Hall for a 'critical' American Marchais...."

It is lamentable that a Marxist can make such a superficial analysis, so superstructural, so subjective and so mechanical. The rich dynamic of the class struggle, in particular the 1968 upsurge, for Barnes has no influence on the political superstructures. "Stalinism" in general and in the abstract remains as hieratic [sacred] as an Egyptian god, immune to the vulgar and pedestrian laws of the class struggle. The pressures of a workers movement on the rise, of the imperialist bourgeoisie, of the rise of the political revolution in the workers states, of the privileged sectors inside the CPs do not exist.

He gives even less weight to the fundamental fact that European mass Communist parties have constructed apparatuses and finances increasingly autonomous from Moscow, which exert pressure toward the social-democratization of the CPs, toward the constitution of national bureaucracies.

Barnes correctly insists that at this time the European CPs continue to be Stalinist, because they "remain subordinate to the fundamental interests of the Kremlin bureaucracy." But he doesn't reason like a materialist. He does not emphasize that this "subordination" has an objective, material base: the financial dependence of their apparatuses on the world Stalinist apparatus. He does not acknowledge that with the growth of their mass influence, the CPs are advancing toward the creation of apparatuses increasingly autonomous of Moscow and increasingly dependent upon the national proletariat and bourgeoisie, to the point of constituting national bureaucracies; that is, they are advancing toward social-democratization.

For that reason Barnes' analysis is subjective. If it were not for that material bond of dependence between the national CP apparatus and that of Moscow, how could one explain Stalinism? Perhaps by a real ideological, subjective affinity with the Moscow bureaucracy?

Finally in his adamant refusal to accept the inevitable process of social-democratization of the CPs, Barnes forgets a vivid example, although not European: the Venezuelan Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) [Movement Towards Socialism]. Born as a result of the previous crisis of world Stalinism (the impact of the Cuban revolution), arising out of the split in the Venezuelan CP, today the MAS is channeling the masses toward socialism via channels independent from Moscow, in order to keep them under the control of bourgeois democracy. It is the image of the future for the European Eurocommunist parties--with which it presently has excellent relations. Looking at it from another angle, by denying this process, in one direction, Barnes cannot explain that an inverse process occurred in the case of the Cuban leadership.

Are Eurocommunist Parties Progressive?

As we have already suggested, Mandel and his disciples go to the other pole. To their credit they have emphasized the process of social-democratization of the CPs. In this respect the difference that we may have concerning the present scope of this process is not important at this time. But Mandel and his disciples extract the alarming conclusion that the social-democratization of the CPs points in a progressive direction.

Concretely they tell us that the leaderships of the European Communist parties will undoubtedly be obliged to take a more elastic attitude than in 1944-45, that they will be obliged to make concessions, especially concerning respect for proletarian democracy, and to accept, even if it is only forced and grudging, a minimum of self-organization of the workers. And they also point out that the objective situation in Europe prevents the Communist parties from behaving in a manner identical to the present-day social-democratic parties, approximating their behavior to the SPs just before or immediately following World War I.

For us it was always incomprehensible to refer to the social democracy of "before or immediately following World War I" as something less counterrevolutionary than the social democracy of today. It was that social democracy which assassinated Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg and destroyed the soviets during the German revolutions of the post-war period. It was "immediately before" that the social democracy sent the masses to the slaughterhouse, by supporting their respective imperialist bourgeoisies in their war plans. But aside from this historical disagreement, we differ fundamentally with the idea of Eurocommunist parties being less counterrevolutionary or lesser enemies of workers democracy and the self-organization of the masses.

We believe that like Tito and Mao, the Eurocommunist parties--as the Spanish CP has fully demonstrated--will do everything in their power to impede revolution in their respective countries, and that they will systematically oppose any and all advance toward workers democracy and the self-organization of the masses.

This erroneous and dangerous analysis by Mandel and his disciples concerning Eurocommunism has the same methodological defect as Barnes, although they reached opposite conclusions. It is not materialist because it ignores the fundamental fact that the dynamic toward a break with Moscow and toward social-democratization is the dynamic toward financial and apparatus autonomy from Moscow and toward the construction of national bureaucracies. And it does not foresee that a national bureaucracy hasn't a single reason to be less counterrevolutionary than Stalinism--as social democracy certainly is not.

Once again Mandel and his disciples attribute the progressive aspects of an objective process (a mass upsurge, crisis of the world Stalinist apparatus) to the parties that reflect the influence

of this process. And just as they're wrong about Tito and Mao to the point of capitulating before them--attributing to them revolutionary perspectives and therefore renouncing the construction of Trotskyist parties in China and Yugoslavia, as well as the necessity of political revolution against these bureaucracies--with these analyses they are opening a dangerous door to capitulate before the present-day Eurocommunist parties.

### The Perspectives

We have already given our opinion with regard to the dynamic of the Eurocommunist parties. We think it correct, for now, to continue characterizing them as Stalinists, insofar as we maintain that they have as yet not broken discipline with Moscow (with the possible exception of the PCE). But we insist at the same time that they are still embarked upon the dynamic of forming national bureaucracies, directly tied to the bourgeoisie of each country and to the imperialist bourgeoisie in general. We maintain that this dynamic fatally leads to a new crisis of the world Stalinist apparatus, i.e., to completing, sooner or later, the process of social-democratization of the European CPs, and to breaking the bonds to Moscow.

After that point is reached we can hardly continue to talk of "Stalinism" as the SWP does in relation to China and Yugoslavia. Because Stalinism is above all a world apparatus, as Trotsky repeatedly characterized it:

"As regards the ex-Comintern, its social basis, properly speaking, is of a twofold nature. On the one hand, it lives on the subsidies of the Kremlin.... On the other hand, the various machines of the ex-Comintern feed from the same sources as the Social Democracy, that is, the superprofits of imperialism. The growth of the Communist parties in recent years, their infiltration into the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, their installation in the state machinery, the trade unions, parliaments, municipalities, etc., have strengthened in the extreme their dependence on national imperialism at the expense of their traditional dependence on the Kremlin."

--Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1938-39 ["A Fresh Lesson," pp.70-71]

When this dynamic predicted by Trotsky almost 40 years ago reaches its culmination, we will stop talking about Stalinism. Because just as Tito and Mao could not create a new international apparatus after their break with the Soviet bureaucracy and its world apparatus, much less will the European Communist Parties be able to do so. We believe that they will continue being Stalinist in their ideology and policies; moreover, they will continue to drag along the characteristics of monolithic organizations. But even in the best of cases it will be a new, different "Stalinism" because it will have broken with the Kremlin's discipline.

The crisis of the Stalinist apparatus opens enormous perspectives to the workers and mass movement, as well as to the Trotskyists. If we have emphasized our criticisms of the principles of Mandel and his current, it is because their analyses run the danger of feeding into a capitulatory line. But if at the same time we point out our profound disagreements with Barnes, it is because his definition, which limits itself to characterizing the Eurocommunist parties as "Stalinist" will prevent him from understanding and grasping the progressive character of the crisis of world Stalinism....



THE BITTER FRUIT OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY [excerpt]

by Ernest Mandel

To the very extent that all this theoretical, political and organizational degeneration undermined the bases on which the program and the existence of the Communist International was founded, it could only lead to the decomposition of the latter in the long run. The bureaucracies of the Communist Parties submitted blindly to the Kremlin's orders--which to an increasingly obvious degree corresponded neither to the interests of the proletariat of their respective countries nor even to their own bureaucratic interests--only to the extent that they saw no other way out, whether as a result of their material dependence or of their vision of their national and international political perspectives in the middle run.

As soon as this situation changed, it was merely a question of time before the "iron monolithism" collapsed like a house of cards. The "national messianism" of the CPSU would produce as many "messianisms" as there were powerful CPs materially independent of the Kremlin. The "single center" would produce polycentrism. "Proletarian internationalism" identified with the "defense of the Soviet bastion" would end up with the proliferation of "national communisms." In this sense Eurocommunism was engraved in the future of the world communist movement as soon as the theory of socialism in one country was adopted. With his prophetic genius, Trotsky understood this and proclaimed it at that time. [Here Mandel quotes from The Third International After Lenin, pp. 71-73: p. 4 this bulletin.]

The CP executed the 1935 turn out of loyalty to the Soviet Union, such as they understood it (that is to say, loyalty to the Soviet bureaucracy on which they increasingly depended materially and politically). But the turn of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, and all it implied, set in motion another, autonomous, mechanism over which the Kremlin lost control. Increasingly integrating itself into the bourgeois state and reaping the patronage offered by bourgeois parliamentary democracy as a result of their electoral and trade-union successes, the CP apparatuses of the "democratic" imperialist countries were henceforth subject to an independent material pressure to some extent antagonistic to that of the Kremlin. If socialism in one country ended up with national communism, the theory and practice of the popular front culminate in a political line which feeds the gradual process of social-democratization. These are two of the principal historical roots of Eurocommunism.

Most of the more lucid Eurocommunist leaders are perfectly well aware of this. They endlessly refer to the "great historical precedents" of the Popular-Front policy and the "Anti-Fascist Union of the Resistance" during and after the Second World War, as preparatory stages for Eurocommunism. They are not wrong....

This time [the 1960's], however, the motion was not only more difficult to control than in 1935-38 or in 1941-47; it was actually rather frenzied.

The principal reason for this lay in the cumulative effects of successive turns, the length of the new reformist turn, the changed composition of the CP apparatuses, the different nature of recruitment to the CPs on the basis of their longstanding neo-reformist politics. In place of one turn after another every three years and the flexibility and diversity of experience this gave the bureaucrats and cadres of the CPs, was substituted a reformist practice applied without interruption for almost, if not more than, twenty years. An entire generation of Eurocommunist cadres have learned nothing else but to prepare for nice elections and to lead actions for immediate demands. The progressive disappearance of an entire generation of communists formed in the years before 1935, during the Resistance and even during the years of the Cold War, who were familiar with a quite different practice from that of today, plays a very important role in this connection....

The invasion of the socialist Czechoslovak Republic was the straw that broke the camel's back. How much ground was covered between the crushing of the Hungarian revolution by Soviet tanks in 1956, without a single CP leadership--except the Yugoslav--expressing the slightest public criticism, and the many protests on the part of the Eurocommunist CPs following the invasion of Czechoslovakia! It is not only the real enthusiasm which the Prague Spring imparted to the ranks of the European CPs, if not to the entire European proletariat, which explains this sudden change. The many ties woven by the Dubcek leadership with the Eurocommunists obviously mean something too. The manifest unpopularity of the invasion in the eyes of the European working masses, the fear of a new wave of anti-communism and serious electoral losses also played a role in this affair.

But most of all, there was a secret politico-historical apprehension: "And if tomorrow, we, the Italian, French, British Communists, were in power and our policies displeased 'Big Brother,' what would prevent him from treating 'our country' the way he treated Czechoslovakia? What would prevent him from bullying 'us' or worse, as 'they' beat Frantisek Kriegel and his comrades who were kidnapped when the tanks arrived in Prague?" This time, the ability to imagine the unimaginable, an ability which had not yet been developed in 1936 and in 1949, did indeed exist. Time had done its work. The experience of Stalinism, at least in its worst aspects, had been assimilated. It was like a unanimous cry from the heart: "That kind of thing in our country? Never!"

The Stalinist International had passed. Or at least it more and more reduced itself to skeletal organizations living directly off of subsidies from the Kremlin. There was no longer room within it for mass parties with their own roots in their working class, to the extent that the international working class had now assimilated what is essential to the nature of Stalinism....

"EUROCOMMUNISM" IN QUESTION [excerpt]

by Daniel Bensaid

[From Rouge, 7-8 January 1978; first article in the series, "Contributions to the Debate on the Crisis of Stalinism." While historically personally hostile to the Mandel/Krivine leadership, Bensaid has remained an integral part of it. He was one of the major exponents of a split with the SWP and of the pro-guerrilla wing of the USec in the 1972-75 period.]

1)...we ourselves have explained for years that the mass Communist parties are undergoing an as-yet unfinished process of social-democratization, while being careful to indicate the approximative extent of such a metaphor: the end product of this process will not be a second version of social democracy, but a new reality determined by the balance of international class forces (unless, in certain cases, it is consummated by a fusion between communist and socialist parties, which is not absolutely excluded). But in no case would it be a question of simply returning to the social democracy historically incarnated over the past half century by the Second International.

2) A New Stage in the Crisis: The CPs' Subordination to the USSR is No Longer either Absolute or Automatic.

To note the crisis of Stalinism is to raise a series of questions to be resolved. The first of these: What precisely is Stalinism, this "system," or this "bloc," which is in crisis? What defines it as such?...

If all the aforementioned elements [frontist politics of class collaboration, close bureaucratic links with the working class, strongly bureaucratized internal regime, degeneration of Marxism] are thus an integral part of the CPs' identity, they are not however unique to them. Thus the originality of the CPs ultimately reduced to two historical criteria:

1) Even if they were formed later, the Communist parties separated themselves from social democracy under the impact of the Russian revolution by accepting, even if only formally, the 21 conditions for membership in the Third International and the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Today, however, the abandonment by several CPs (Japanese, Portuguese, Spanish, French, English) of this theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, although it simply puts an ideological stamp of approval on an already established practice, nevertheless tears up one of the birth certificates of the CPs and erases their doctrinal originality in comparison to social democracy.

2) The policies of the Stalinist CPs meant systematic subordination to the diplomatic interests of the Soviet bureaucracy and safeguarding the international status quo in the name of building socialism in one country....

In effect, the specific nature of Stalinism stemmed from the absolute subordination of the CPs' policies to the conception of

the status quo currently in force in the USSR....

What is new in the present crisis of Stalinism is that the CPs can have their own idea of the status quo, determined by their national position, and can defend it even against Moscow's ideas. For them there is no question of unleashing revolutionary movements capable of upsetting the world-wide balance of forces. On the contrary, they try to channel and betray any upsurge of the masses the best they can. But the fact that another conception of the status quo can be counterposed to that defined by the CPSU already constitutes something fundamentally new and a new stage in the crisis of Stalinism....

And although it may happen that the Soviet bureaucracy and that of the different CPs share not only interests in common, but also a common viewpoint on the means to be used in any given situation, there no longer is the same absolute and mechanical subordination; there can also be conflict without such a conflict resulting in the pure and simple liquidation of the recalcitrant leadership.... The Soviets verified this at their own expense with the defeat of the Lister faction in the Spanish CP by the Carrillo leadership.

We must understand the full scope of this defeat. For nearly half a century, in a context of defeats and setbacks, the Kremlin bureaucracy has exploited the prestige of the revolution, renewed by the military victories of the Second World War, against the national leaderships of the CPs if necessary. Today, these leaderships can, on the other hand, draw on support from the radicalization and the aspirations of a working class which has been profoundly rejuvenated in order to assert their independence in relation to the USSR. It seems in fact that the Soviet bureaucracy has understood this and takes it into account in recognizing both CPs in Sweden and adopting a cautious position toward the split in the British CP....

### 3) The Rise of Stalinism: an Uneven, Incomplete, Contradictory Process.

Thus, the Chinese CP, as a component of the Communist International, was not spared by Stalinization. But it did not therefore become a Stalinist party, subordinated to Soviet diplomacy so absolutely....

It is for all these reasons that, up until the Cultural Revolution, we characterize the Maoist leadership as bureaucratic centrist and not as purely and simply Stalinist.

In its case, as in the case of the Vietnamese revolution, one cannot consider that they are Stalinist parties which let their hand be forced by the course of events or by the pressure of the masses. When they have really wanted to, the Stalinists have always found a way of strangling a revolution even if, as in Greece or Spain, they have had to commit suicide at the same time....

We have emphasized this point to show to what extent it would be metaphysical and undialectical to treat Stalinism as a closed system

(with absolute boundaries separating internal from external) or as a bloc without fissures. To do so would be to condemn oneself to not understanding either the present contradictions or certain international transformations which are among the most important of the last century/half-century....

4)...The present crisis of Stalinism cannot therefore be considered as a more or less reversible zigzag or as a process which is more or less reversible according to the role of the individuals in place, in the USSR and in the CPs. On the contrary, this crisis is the outcome of fundamental transformations in the balance of class forces on a world scale and of the resulting contradictions between the masses and their bureaucratic apparatuses.

5) A Test: Civil Rights and Dissidence in the Eastern European Countries

...The formulas for pacts, alliances and compromises can vary infinitely without giving the slightest indication of the degree of crisis of Stalinism in a given party and of the degree of its social-democratization. And for an obvious reason: class collaboration and frontist politics are not traits specific to Stalinist parties but are, on the contrary, traits common to reformist parties, whether Stalinist or social-democratic. So to say that the Portuguese CP went as far in its class collaboration as the CPs which make themselves out to be Eurocommunist demonstrates nothing except the obvious: that reformist parties are reformist, whatever their relationship with the USSR.

Abandoning the dictatorship of the proletariat constitutes a somewhat more serious element, as it directly affects the historical and doctrinal identity of the CPs (i.e., how they differentiated themselves from social democracy) and indirectly poses (over time) the question of the nature of the USSR and of democracy.

But what really distinguishes CPs like the French, the Spanish or the Italian from the Portuguese CP is their positions on the intervention in Czechoslovakia (which the Portuguese CP supported), on civil rights, on dissidents in the Eastern European countries, which directly touch the sore spot, the vital spot of the ruling bureaucracy.

6) The point reached today by the crisis of Stalinism poses a triple question to the CPs concerning their relationships with the USSR, with their own national state apparatus and with imperialism. It additionally calls into question their ideological identity and thereby their relationship with the masses....

When the PCI welcomes and fêtes Biermann, the whole mechanism--of trials, exiles, expulsions from the workers movement (now equated with a single party)--could come to a grinding halt.

That is why the CPs' position on Czechoslovakia and the dissidents constitutes a test of prime importance.

However, none of the CPs has yet gone all the way to a break. This is because they have no interest in doing so. Provided that the links which are maintained are neither too constraining nor too compromising, provided that they contain the demarcations necessary to their electoral aims, the CPs have on the contrary an interest in maintaining a form of relations which perpetuates their own tradition and bears witness to their historical identity and their originality.

A new Soviet intervention of the Budapest or Prague type could of course accelerate the distancing, mark a new stage. But it is unlikely that the CPs would go so far as an open and frontal break as long as they have not woven other links with the masses whom they organize and have not found a new stability from this point of view....

The problem for the CPs is that there is danger in releasing their bird in the hand in hope of getting two in the bush, in risking a break with the USSR without having already conquered positions assuring them an electoral clientele through the state mechanisms.

To do that, they must get the bourgeoisie to recognize them as governmental parties. Not as parties which are called into the government as a last recourse and ejected afterwards, as at the time of the Liberation, but as governmental parties recognized as such, as "alternating" partners....

The hypothesis is thus that the conditions of the break between the USSR and the CPs will be radically new the day that certain of these CPs attain governmental and state positions such that the advantages which they derive from their national integration predominate decisively. The break would then be all the more probable in that the embryo of it existed in the counterrevolutionary theory of socialism in one country, which can in practice only lead to "socialisms in one country," i.e., in the last analysis, to the primacy of chauvinism....

The crisis of Stalinism, of which the "Eurocommunist" CPs' positions mark a new stage, constitutes a process which continues to degenerate and which cannot be reversed without the intervention of a new and fundamental modification in the balance of world forces to the detriment of the working class.

ARE THE CPs STILL STALINIST? [excerpt]

by Filoche

["Are the CPs Still Stalinist?" by Gérard Filoche appeared as part of a series, "Contributions to the Debate on the Crisis of Stalinism," in Rouge, 13 February 1978. Filoche, a long-time oppositionist in the LCR, currently generally sides with the SWP/OCI against the LCR leadership but refuses to formally join with the SWP/OCI forces.]

2) The Real Question Is: Are We or Aren't We in a New Period, That of Post-Stalinism?

Comrade Bensaïd avoids answering this question. He says: "This is a process" that is complex, differentiated, contradictory, unfinished, open-ended, with an epicenter and "porous edges." For four pages he piles up examples of differences and contradictions-- a real mosaic. But the problem is to go from the particular to the general.

What stage are we in? This is the question from which the appropriate tasks can be deduced. Every process is criss-crossed by breaks, fissures, and qualitative leaps which alter the subject under study. Can we say that the "destalinization of the Eurocommunist CPs did not occur from a left viewpoint" as a recent article in Cahiers de la Taupe [Notebooks of the Mole] asserts, and as do the comrades who explain that "already no longer Stalinist, not yet (and perhaps never) social-democratic, the PCI appears as a reformist workers party with Stalinist origins--a national-communist party."

These declarations take a position upon the fundamental question: the CPs have broken with the USSR; they are "already no longer" Stalinist, their line is nationalist....

No! The "process" will not be linear: splits and revolutions will explode before the eyes of analysts less experienced than the Trotskyists. A "post-Stalinist" epoch is not conceivable unless new victorious revolutions can significantly alter the international balance of forces codified at Helsinki and Belgrade, unless the crisis of Stalinism makes itself felt through revolutionary upheavals in the very citadel where the bureaucracy flourishes, the USSR. The period opened up by the advent of the Stalinist bureaucracy and by putting the Left Opposition and the Fourth International into a minority is not closed.

3) Three Fundamental Aspects of Eurocommunism

1. Some comrades are expounding the idea of a "social-democratization" of the CPs, understood in the literal sense of the term (and not by analogy, as a tendency to designate one of the elements of a contradiction), and they thus wind up counterposing the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy to the national interests of the CPs. For them it is clear: the "process" is completed.

"The break of the PCF with the USSR is not a sham."

The truth is that Marchais does not need to go to Moscow in order to uphold Stalinist policies. The disintegration of organizational ties does not imply the shattering of Stalinism but rather the establishment of policies which contribute, through different paths and means on the part of both the Western parties and the Kremlin, to the same objective: maintaining the social status quo by betraying the revolutionary interests of the proletariat in ways which are not those...of social democracy! The CP and the SP are not twin stars; their natures are different as is confirmed by their present break.

The CPs are Stalinist, and we do not want, at a moment when Marchais-Kanapa-Leroy are trying to whitewash themselves of everything Stalinist, to lend credence to their attempts!

2. To evoke the predominance of the "national aspect" of the break with the USSR and of "destalinization" is also to open the door to analyses concerning the possibility that the CPs will take a "centrist" course. The CPs are supposedly more to the "left" in order to "respond" to the upsurge of the working-class masses. The ultimate consequence could be to derive a policy of political "pressure" on the CPs....

3. The present policies of the Eurocommunist CPs are on the whole a shift to the right, despite certain formal concessions made to the masses on the question of democratic rights in the Eastern bloc. All the recent, concrete political choices made by the CPs are there to prove it....

These three aspects (that is, the Stalinist CPs have not broken politically with the USSR, they are counterrevolutionary and "unreformable," and their present policies represent fundamentally a turn to the right) constitute a basis from which to analyze, at greater length than we are able to do here, the particularities and the aggravation of the contradictions of Stalinism in crisis.

--Gérard Filoche  
Member of the PB of the LCR



THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY AND THE STALINIST PARTIES  
DEFEND THE STATUS QUO IN EUROPE [excerpt]

by Lecaute

[From Rouge, 2 April 1978. C. Lecaute is/was the leader of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction in France.]

G. Filoche criticizes D. Bensaid's superficial analysis of the phenomena designated as "Eurocommunism" by underlining that "the disintegration of organizational ties does not imply the shattering of Stalinism but rather the establishment of policies which contribute, through different paths and means on the part of both the Western parties and the Kremlin to the same objective: maintaining the social status quo."

We must subscribe to this assertion to the degree that it implies:

1) not only that, as Bensaid concedes, the CPs have not yet "gone so far as to break" (with the Kremlin) and are not yet "determined only by their national interests," but in fact that the current policies of the CPs, still Stalinist, remain predominantly determined by their connection with the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy;

2) that the social-chauvinist tendencies which distinguish the politics of the various CPs are fundamentally the product of the Stalinist orientation of "socialism in one country" and of "peaceful coexistence" with imperialism, and not of some external factor which might tend to denature the CPs into "social-democratized" parties;

3) that the tendencies to integrate into the structures of their imperialist states, which contribute to giving the conservatism of the CPs "a dual social base," have not yet reached the point of becoming the dominant motivation for their political orientation.

Filoche's formula is however too categorical in its denial of "the shattering of Stalinism." In reality, these same needs, in the face of the new upsurge of social revolution, [make the CPs pursue] the defense of the status quo and policies of political collaboration with imperialism (which are common to all components of the bureaucracy), deepen a series of rivalries and contradictions which indicate very strong tendencies, not only toward "social-democratization" but also toward the dislocation of Stalinism, tendencies which will develop on an unprecedented level in the coming trials of the class struggle....

The Policy of the Western CPs: "Right Turn" or Application  
of the Stalinist Popular-Front Policy?

In [another] error associated with the preceding one, Filoche

affirms that "the present policies of the Western CPs are fundamentally a turn to the right": giving as sole justification that "all the recent concrete political choices made by the CPs are there to prove it."

But in what way do these "choices" constitute a "turn"? And why "to the right"? The current policies of the CPs unfold under different forms, adapted to conditions of varied political crises, from the same general orientation which was actively illustrated both in France and in Spain in the 1930's, in several European countries at the time of the post-war revolutionary crisis, more recently in Chile and in Portugal.... With different variants, these policies have obeyed the same principle. The Seventh Congress of the Comintern which codified this principle did itself constitute a "strategic turn" which "legalized the opportunist turn carried out in France and disseminated it among the rest of mankind."

So does Filoche want to say that the CPs' current policy is "fundamentally" more "to the right" than those of the Seventh Congress? Or better yet, according to the same reasoning as that applied to China, that loosening connections with the Kremlin would by itself constitute an evolution "to the right"? In all hypotheses, his strange assertion leads in substance to repeating what is most dubious in the thesis of "social-democratization," that is to say that whenever the CPs increase their distance from the Kremlin in favor of coming closer in practice to the social democrats, that would constitute, intrinsically and "fundamentally," a "turn to the right."

To say that is to forget that while the Stalinists and social democrats are distinct (in terms of the social bases of their opportunism); they are absolutely equal in counterrevolution: "As a social stratum, Stalin, Molotov and company are no better and no worse than the Blums, the Jouhaux, the Citrines, the Thomases" (In Defense of Marxism).

To G. Filoche's thesis we must therefore counterpose the following one: above and beyond particular applications and formal readjustments (like abandoning the dictatorship of the proletariat officially), "all of the recent political choices made by the CPs" fundamentally adhere to the orientation followed by the Stalinists for nearly 40 years and which, each time the sharpening of the class struggle requires it to, takes a precise form: the policy of the popular front, a policy which the Fourth International characterizes as "one of the last political resources of imperialism in the fight against proletarian revolution."...

REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE SWP [excerpt]

by Caroline Lund

[From International Socialist Review, April 1978, in The Militant, 7 April 1978.]

Another area in which Italy illustrates a general trend in Europe is in regard to the crisis of Stalinism and, in particular, the spread of the phenomenon often called Eurocommunism.

What is new in this phenomenon inaccurately labeled Eurocommunism (it is neither communist nor exclusively European) is, first, increasing criticism of some of the repression in the Soviet Union, while still accepting the basic features of Stalinist rule there. This reflects an attempt by the CPs to make cosmetic concessions to the growing mass sentiment for democratic rights and disgust with Stalinist totalitarianism.

Second was further codification of these parties' reformist politics to make themselves more acceptable to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sectors as candidates for government posts. The latter included such revisions as dropping the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" from their programs. This did not signify a fundamental turn to the right but merely expressed the real program they have been carrying out for decades.

The Stalinists were prompted to make these changes by growing prospects of getting into governments. They were getting more votes as the masses looked to them for solutions to their problems. There were indications that at least some sectors of the capitalists were beginning to look to the CPs as the agents they might need to administer their austerity policies in the face of rebellious workers.

There are limits on the evolution of the European Communist parties either toward Social Democracy or toward centrist policies. The differentiating factor between the Stalinist and Social Democratic parties is not their reformist policies but the link of the Communist parties to Moscow. Despite continuing frictions, there has been no fundamental break between these parties and the Kremlin. Their criticisms of Moscow are not a qualitative break but a continuation of the logic of socialism in one country and the disintegration of world Stalinism.

There are basic elements of continuity that all these parties have with Stalinism, such as their rejection of real workers democracy. This was recently confirmed by the silence of the "Eurocommunist" parties in face of the struggle of the Romanian miners. Since many of these parties have special diplomatic ties with the Romanian regime, they had no difficulty ignoring the appeals of the Romanian miners for support.

The Kremlin itself does not view "Eurocommunism" as a fundamental break. The adjustments being made by the European Stalinist parties have advantages for the Kremlin as well as carrying the

overhead cost of giving legitimacy to demands for democratic rights inside the workers states. Moscow wants strong CPs, since this helps further its own international diplomacy. So far, judging from the Kremlin's response, the advantages have outweighed the overhead.

This was illustrated by Moscow's sixtieth anniversary celebration of the Russian revolution last November. All the "Eurocommunist" parties attended, and all were allowed to speak except for Santiago Carrillo of the Spanish Communist Party, who has gone the furthest in criticizing Moscow.

While the Kremlin attacks Carrillo, as an individual, they have not made a broadside attack on the so-called Eurocommunist parties, or even on the entire Spanish CP, even though they all say similar things. Nor have the Eurocommunist parties come out with a joint defense of Carrillo against Moscow.

--23 February 1978

TACTICS FOR BUILDING A UNIFIED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANISATION [excerpt]

by the National Committee of the International Marxist Group

[The document from which this is excerpted was adopted by the NC of the IMG on 18 March 1978, by 17 votes in favor, none against, 2 abstentions and 3 not voting. From the IMG Pre-Conference Bulletin, No. 13, 1978.]

(i) The Communist Party

Despite the moves of the CPGB towards criticism of the denial of democratic rights in Eastern Europe, the organisation remains Stalinist. This characterisation applies to both the major currents within the party. The position of the central leadership of the CPGB on the crimes of the Soviet bureaucracy is both partial in itself and is within the framework of an agreement with Moscow's basic outlook, backing the policy of détente and peaceful coexistence. It refuses in any way to challenge the basic characterisation of the countries of Eastern Europe as socialist and therefore makes no link between its stand on democratic rights and the need to mobilise the masses in Eastern Europe on a programme to overthrow the bureaucracy.

The main thrust of the New British Road is thoroughly reformist. It substitutes the fight to mobilise the masses to overthrow the bourgeois state through the formation of organisations of workers power by the strategic task of struggling for the extension of democracy into every sphere. In this scheme of things, the mass struggle is subordinated to parliament. The Spanish and Italian CPs' backing for austerity programmes against the working class is the future of the British Road. There is no possibility of the British CP evolving towards revolutionary Marxism. Its direction is in exactly the opposite direction. The main strategic line of advance for the CP remains that of "left unity." But in the last few years this conception has been put to harsh test in the class struggle, as the left social democrats have moved to the right....

The most signal mark of the rightward drift of the CP was its stand on the side of the bureaucracy in opposition to all struggles which threatened to smash Phase 2 of the Labour Government's incomes policy.

Our long term political and organisational objective must be to animate a tendency in the CP on the basis of revolutionary Marxism.

FROM THE PCF'S 22ND CONGRESS TO THE DEFEAT OF THE LEFT

by Jean Elleinstein

[From Le Monde, 13 and 14 April 1978.]

I. Revolution Isn't What It Used to Be

...The purpose of these articles is to present my contribution to the discussion initiated by the PCF Political Bureau among Communists as part of the preparation for the 26-27 April Central Committee meeting.

I would have preferred to publish them in my Party's press, but it appears this is not possible in the present circumstances....

Other Communists have been led to express themselves outside of their Party's press for the same reason. Some of them do this in order to call into question the 22nd Congress, with which they disagreed on important points (for example, eliminating the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat). I think they are right to request a more democratic functioning of democratic centralism, but I reject the attempted amalgam of all those who express a critical point of view toward the present policy of the Party. "We do not suffer from too much of the 22nd Congress, but rather from not enough," said Georges Marchais--correctly--following the CP's national conference in January 1978--a point I emphasized strongly in my intervention. My disagreement with the Political Bureau of the Communist Party is not over the spirit of the decisions of the 22nd Congress, but over the way in which they are applied....

In short, the PCF still remains unable--in contrast to the Italian Communist Party--to extend its influence beyond the political and social area in which it is active. This area has even tended to shrink somewhat, despite the Common Program, the 18-year-old vote and even the real strengthening of the Party, because there is no direct relationship between the number of members or the activity of Party organizations and its electoral influence.

The reasons for such a situation are numerous and cannot all be blamed on the Party and its leadership....

In my opinion, the reasons for this are older and deeper. They lie in the PCF's delay in transforming itself and taking account of the new problems posed by the evolution of French society over the last 25 years. Already by 1956, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the PCF refused to go further than the problems then posed and still remains on this side of them. While it condemned the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries, it limited itself to sporadic criticisms and retreated behind a cautious and embarrassed silence. Today the analysis of Soviet reality still falls far short of what is necessary.

L'Humanité continues to embellish this reality and to cover up a number of aspects altogether essential to understanding what is

going on in the USSR. The articles devoted to Lioubimov and to Rostropovich exemplify what must be done still more thoroughly. Soviet foreign policy is rarely called into question, for example, with regard to Africa or China....

During the election campaign a pamphlet on freedom was junked, merely because it included a photograph of Leonid Plyushch and Pierre Juquin shaking hands at the November 1976 meeting at the Mutualité....

It seems to me, however, that without a principled position on the USSR our inadequate interventions lack credibility, disorienting many members, yet without convincing those outside the Party.

### The USSR, an Anti-Model

We must have the courage to recognize that socialism exists only in a very imperfect and incomplete form in the USSR. There are bits and pieces of socialism, an unfinished socialism, because the bureaucracy dominates there and political democracy does not exist. Not only is the USSR not a model or example, it actually constitutes an anti-model. Socialism as we understand it does not exist anywhere. We do not really know what it could be, but we know well what it should not be. The fact that our Party bears the same name as the party-states which govern the USSR and other countries of this type constitutes a weighty handicap in relation to French opinion. All the more reason to take our approach to its logical conclusion and clearly pose the problems--without anti-sovietism, naturally: what Communist could forget the sacrifice of 20 million Soviet citizens during the Second World War?--but without too many of these oratorical precautions, which seem to many Frenchmen to be a form of "beating around the bush."

A principled critique of the USSR poses the real question of the real identity of French Communism. It was born at Tours in 1920 out of national and international conditions which have since become irrelevant. The 22nd Congress was in part the first major attempt to clearly discard the dogmas of the past and to clear the basis for a new policy. In modern-day France the conception of revolution itself cannot be what it was formerly. The world has changed, and France has been transformed. It is a question of finding a new path which is neither the traditional social-democratic line nor the Communist orientation of Tours and the Comintern.

### II. The Necessary Transformation

Georges Marchais' last speech at Lille and his last televised address no longer mention these social layers ["middle-class wage earners and intellectuals"]. The slogan "Make the Rich Pay" was used frequently without any refinement--but where do "the rich" begin and where do they end? One has the sense of viewing the re-birth of those distant days of the "class against class" tactic. Instead of isolating the monopolies, this is a way of turning one's back on the idea of the union of the French people, ratified by the 22nd Congress.

The historic alliance of laborers, workers, salaried and intellectual middle layers--which must constitute the new power bloc expressing the social content of the future socialist state--now appears to be neglected indeed. Since the elections anti-intellectualism has become the norm in the columns of L'Humanité, from Wolinski's drawing to Cardoze's article. Let us speak frankly: we must move toward a profound modification of Party policy and practice toward the salaried middle classes, the engineers, technicians, low-level management and intellectuals....

We need a new way of experiencing politics, of integrating it into our daily life, within the factories as well as in the towns.

The image of the Party must change profoundly, but for this the Party itself must change profoundly....

### III. Get to the Bottom of Things

It has become even clearer that the PCF must in every area push to its logical conclusion the approach symbolized by the 22nd Congress. It must recognize more clearly the errors of the past, and it has difficulty doing this. Why, for example, 26 years after the expulsions of Marty and Tillon, have the errors of the PCF leadership in 1952 not been acknowledged and justice done to those expelled--which would not however mean endorsing all their positions. Why was Roger Garaudy expelled? Why haven't we clearly recognized the influence of Stalinism on the history of the PCF and the consequences of unconditional defense of the USSR and of affiliation to the Comintern, for example, at the time of the Soviet-German pact and the "phony war" [in 1939-40]? Steps have been taken in this direction, and I don't ignore them. But we always stop half way....

In this way, for example, the problem of [the Party's] functioning is posed; very few communists question democratic centralism even when its expression is not very felicitous, because it stresses democracy more than centralism. But in the history of the CP--often for very honorable reasons--there has been more centralism than democracy. The real question is to understand its meaning in modern-day France.

We are not in the Russia of the Czars, or on the morrow of a civil war. We are not in pre-war France, occupied France or cold-war France. However much it seems to me that the idea of "factions" must be rejected--and tendencies are only the first form of factions--it equally seems to me that the debate within the Party must be permanent and transparent....

We have hundreds of thousands of Communists who democratically express themselves in their cells, but we cannot stop at discussing vertically (from the cell to the Central Committee). There must equally be horizontal discussion. This is not in contradiction to democratic centralism as Lenin conceived of it.



### Some Questions

It is a direct heritage of the Stalinist conception of the party to reject this horizontal discussion. Moreover, at the 10th Congress of the CPSU which suppressed factions, Lenin proposed and put to a vote the production of a "discussion bulletin" designed to allow ongoing debate within the party, making known everyone's ideas and proposals. It is unfortunate that this orientation has been discarded. The formation of factions and tendencies must not be confused with the exchange of opinions. Better yet, didn't Lenin conceive of democratic centralism as favoring the autonomy of rank-and-file and intermediate party organizations?...

Truly, we must get to the bottom of things. Many problems are posed for us by the very fact of the evolution of contemporary France. I enumerate some of them--briefly--to show the richness of theoretical and political debate.

What should we think of Leninism today? What relevance does it have in the present-day situation? Must the Communist Party defend the principles of philosophical materialism? Isn't it necessary to be neither believer nor atheist? This poses our relations with the Christians in new terms.

Shouldn't we define more precisely our socialist plan, its outlines and its aims, in order to show clearly what socialism à la française could be as opposed to all those experiences which today claim to be socialist?

Isn't it necessary to further deepen our conception of democracy and of freedom? Wouldn't it be better to analyze the phenomenon of the present-day state and reflect more on the conditions of transition in our country?...

Don't we need new consideration of and much more activity around all the major qualitative problems which are posed today (ecology and the quality of life, feminism and women's problems, education and trades, parents and children, family and the couple, urban life, culture and leisure time, etc.)?...

REPORT TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PCF [excerpt]

by Georges Marchais

[From a report by Marchais to a CC meeting held 27-29 April 1978. These excerpts, from the end of the report, are aimed mainly at the "Eurocommunist" wing headed by Elleinstein and Althusser.]

There are certain comrades who attribute to us their own confusion. Some of them go even further, confusing the creative spirit with mentally running amuck. Some of them suggest to us that the correct way of moving forward would be to return the dictatorship of the proletariat to a position of honor; another asks quite seriously if perhaps the best way would be simply to renounce being communists all together. What hits you in the face when you come into contact with their writings or the observations of these comrades is their political weakness linked to a total disregard for the realities of struggle in French conditions today.

This is why their approach, whether presented under the banner of "left" or "right," has this in common: it would lead the party to liquidation. Thus we clearly reject it. We wish neither the desiccation nor the dilution of the party, neither the ivory tower nor the swamp.

For the last month, the discussion in our party has been developing from a totally different perspective. The question: "What next?"--that crucial question upon which everything else depends; hundreds of thousands of communists have in fact raised it together, collectively; they debated their varied opinions, drew the lessons of their experience, and they answered clearly. This answer--that we propose the central committee adopt as its own--is clear: more than ever it involves advancing on the policies, the goals, the strategy defined by the 22nd Congress....

This is what our policies have been, this is what they are today, and this is what our policies will be tomorrow. We don't have to come up with a new strategy on the pretext that we have not yet succeeded in making that strategy win!...

For us things are clear: we remain firmly tied to the idea of the Union of the Left; we continue to consider it indispensable to bringing about change and it remains the axis of our strategy. And we remain firmly tied to the content of the Common Program....

Nothing can exempt us from the battle of ideas that we must wage against social-democratic illusions and against the right which preaches resignation.... Our party never restricted itself to being a propaganda party; it is simultaneously a party of action.... What is in many respects decisive today is to apply itself to constructing the conditions for a change of life, step by step, is everywhere to seek out ways of promoting changes favorable to the workers in the relationship of forces, and is to gain everywhere new positions for the forces of change....

The alternative today is not between divisiveness or acceptance by our party of social-democratic policies. It is necessary, it is possible to clear the way for a more solid and more lasting union of the left around catalytic objectives corresponding to the needs of the country. We remain ready to take any realistic nation-wide initiative to this end. We remain ready to take any action capable of favoring the achievement of this or that social or democratic demand....

Strengthening the party means insuring the smooth functioning and perfecting of democratic centralism. It is not by chance that the attacks on our party are concentrated on democratic centralism. Calling it into question would be the surest way of obtaining what the big bourgeoisie and the Socialist Party are obstinately seeking: weakening and liquidating the party's battle-readiness....

Some comrades would like to see established in the party and in its press a sort of permanent discussion about everything and anything. We most certainly will not put up with this, for two closely related reasons. First of all, that would mean dispossessing the leadership bodies at different levels--bodies which are democratically elected by secret ballot--of their responsibility in implementing the policies democratically decided on by our Congresses. We will not permit anyone to reject--even indirectly--the role and the responsibilities of our leadership, from the cells to the political bureau; nobody should think otherwise. To have the greatest concern for the internal democracy of the party is one thing; to dismantle the party in the name of some vague petty-bourgeois anarchism is another thing. In addition, it's clear for anyone with a little common sense that permanent discussion, when all is said and done, means the paralysis of thought and action. We are a democratic party; we are not a discussion club.

The masses strongly aspire (indeed it is a characteristic of our times) to democracy; there is a great desire for collective discussion, debate, reflection among communists. This is very good, very healthy and the 23rd Congress will doubtless extend all that has already been done in this respect. But we must be clear: the Communist Party is a revolutionary party, a vanguard party and there are tendencies intoxicated with spontaneity, anarchistic tendencies to which we cannot yield without renouncing the very existence of a party fit to carry out its vanguard role. How are we to understand the opinion expressed by a comrade according to whom there should no longer be, so to speak, any difference between the party and the masses. That is to say, if one pushes this reasoning to its logical conclusion, that in all respects and at every level that you would have to put an equal sign between these two realities.

Does it have to do with the fact that for several years the French Communist Party (and at the initiative of the party leadership itself) organized a countless number of public debates, directly with all the workers, with the masses, answering all questions, something no other party would ever take the risk of doing? If that's what is at stake it is indeed an irreversible gain. But if, as has

been suggested, it is a question of renouncing the conception of a distinction between internal debate in the party and public debate, then you're dealing with something else again. To this question we have one response and it too is irreversible: it is that the communist party and society are two distinct entities that we absolutely do not intend to equate with each other. The communist party does not seek to reproduce within itself present society and its functioning any more than it seeks to impose its own functioning on society. It is the instrument of combat, the vanguard of the working class and its allies, and it therefore provides itself with the structures, the rules and the life which will make its fight maximally efficient. Therefore, it is fruitless to expect that it renounce its structures, rules, etc., that it dilute itself into an amorphous mass movement, that it abolish its vanguard qualities that are the reasons for its existence.

One last observation: under the cover of their attachment to democracy, some seek to counterpose the base to the top by attacking the "functionaries." We have often said: look at the huge mass of "functionaries" which the big bourgeoisie has at its disposal, from the state apparatus down to computers. Given conditions in which the workers are deprived of the right and the means to carry on political activity in factories, are harassed by harsh working conditions, and have at their disposal a limited amount of free time, we are far from suffering from a plethora of "functionaries" in the party. On the contrary, we don't have enough of them. The party functionaries are men and women whom the workers' party has asked to leave other jobs to dedicate all their time and their energy to the work of the party. These comrades receive workers' wages and we are ready to compare what they make to those of the critics who attack them--attacks which, wherever they come from, are utterly contemptible. I would add that these attacks against "functionaries" are aimed in fact at the working-class character of the party leadership, particularly at the national level. For while it is true that certain categories of workers have available the material resources to assume political responsibilities while at the same time pursuing their professional activity or even to return to this activity after having interrupted it, the same is not true for heavily exploited workers, especially when it is a matter of assuming some level of responsibility. If the communist workers didn't insure that a certain number among them had the means to dedicate themselves to party work, there wouldn't be any workers in the party leadership! Therein lies the originality and the advantage of our party--of a revolutionary party--to count workers among its leadership cadre. We are committed to this and nothing can make us give this up....

Yes, we are determined to go forward. And to advance at our own rate and under our own conditions. The clamoring of some won't change anything. This is the path of common sense, efficiency and genuine daring; this is the path of the future.

THINGS CAN'T GO ON THIS WAY IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY [excerpt]

by Louis Althusser

[From four articles which appeared in Le Monde on 25-28 April 1978. We incorporate excerpts published in the IMG paper, Socialist Challenge, 4 May 1978.]

That poses the question of questions: what is the leadership hiding by keeping silent about the change in strategy it has imposed on the Party?

This is where "hypotheses" arise. They flourish. To be brief, I shall deal with only one of them, the most plausible one.

The leadership would have liked to reduce the following of an SP which as a party was put together starting from virtually nothing by signing the Common Programme and which can now threaten the Party's most vital elements in terms of its electorate, or even one day become, in the "social-democratic" tradition, the prop for a Giscard majority. By reducing the SP's base, the leadership would have liked to strengthen the Party in order to face the risks of a threatening future (the crisis, the Chirac danger, etc.). Why remain silent about this strategic turn? To hide the contradiction between the most recent line (the line of fighting the SP) and the line followed from 1972 to 1977 (the line of close collaboration with the SP), from the united candidacy of Mitterrand in the 1974 presidential elections through the 1976 cantonal elections and 1977 municipal elections....

That seems to have been the fundamental choice made by the leadership after the public "right turn" of the [SP's] Nantes Congress: strengthening the Party at all costs, which meant weakening the SP at all costs, and if need be at the price of sacrificing the Union of the Left. The left lost, but the Party leadership won: it won to the extent that the SP lost relative to its ambitions alone. Everything else (including victory of the left) was sacrificed to this "victory" of the CP over the SP....

There is no doubt that the leadership's old reflex has won out: "the Party (= the leadership) is always right," "everything that has happened confirms our line," "our line is correct," "the Party has followed a consistent line." It is a sign of weakness to be afraid to face reality, when this reality is a change of strategy: they prefer denial ("we haven't changed our line") to the effort to think about what has occurred. After all, Georges Marchais did state on television: "I am going to make my self-criticism.... We should have published my secret report of June 1972 at the time. It was rightist opportunism not to have done so."...

Numerous militants are saying, "It is no longer possible to go on like this," and that it is necessary to denounce and to change from top to bottom the mode of functioning of this "machine" which is the Party. They are demanding this not just for themselves, for their freedom as militants, that is, for the Party (because the Party is its militants), but for the mass of French workers, who cannot conquer in the class struggle without the Communist Party, but who cannot conquer with this Communist Party either, as it presently exists.

These same militants do not want the Party to be a "party like the others." They know only too well what these "others" are, bourgeois oligarchic parties, within which is exercised the undivided domination of a caste of professionals, experts, and intellectuals, closely linked to the upper levels of the State administration.

These same militants believe in the necessity for a revolutionary Party of the class struggle of the exploited; they believe in the necessity for a leadership and officials in this Party. They believe that democratic centralism can and must be retained, provided that its rules are profoundly changed and, more importantly, its practice. This is not just a matter of formal rights, but of that which decides the fate of every formal right: the political life and practice of the Party.

Now we are at the heart of the problem: the Party...What is the Party?

I use the word "machine" advisedly, because it returns to the term of Marx and Lenin for the State. On the face of it, this is a startling statement for someone to make: the Party is obviously not a State in the proper sense, but everything is carried on as if, in its structure and hierarchical functioning, it was closely modelled both on the apparatus of the bourgeois State and on the military apparatus.

This is the parliamentary aspect of the Party. On the one hand there is the mass of militants, who freely discuss in their cells and sections. This is the "sovereign people": but it stops short once the barrier of the federal secretariats, led by full-time officials, is reached. The break is there, where the apparatus takes precedence over the base. There things start to become serious (for the leadership). If the popular will of the base expresses itself in elections, it is in ultra-reactionary forms (majority ballot in three stages for the congresses) and under the close scrutiny of "nominating commissions," which are provided for in the statutes for the election of "officials" but have been illegally extended to the election of congress delegates.

These elections produce the hierarchy of officials: members of the committees and bureaus of the sections, federation and the Central Committee, capped by its political bureau and secretariat. The Central Committee, elected by strictly selected federation delegates, is supposed to be the sovereign organ of the Party, its legislature and executive. In practice this sovereign organ exists more to ratify and ensure the implementation of the leadership's decisions than to propose anything new. We have never heard it said that the Central Committee had taken the least initiative. In reality the Central Committee is more often the executive organ of the leadership than its legislature: in this capacity it is a sort of general assembly of prefects [senior local government administrators appointed by the central government in France] which the leadership dispatches and employs throughout France to "observe"--that is, to control on the spot--the federations, to appoint the federal secretaries, and to handle delicate questions.

The leadership bases itself not only on the members of the Central Committee, but also on the formidable power, often mystical, of its functionaries of all kinds, full-time officials and advisors of the Central Committee, these non-elected unknowns, recruited on the basis of competence or connections, always by co-option--and specialists of every category.

And this is the military aspect of the Party. Everything which has just been said would be incomplete if we did not add the fundamental principle of absolute vertical compartmentalisation, which recalls the compartmentalised form of the military hierarchy. Compartmentalisation has a two-fold effect. On the one hand, it encloses every rank-and-file militant in a narrow ascending column, which rises from their cell to the section, and, beyond that, to the federation and Central Committee. This "ascending traffic" is dominated by full-time officials, who faithfully filter the contributions of the base in the light of the decisions from the top. On the other hand, the rank-and-file militant cannot, outside of section or federation conferences (if they are a delegate), enter into any relationship with the militants of any other cell, which belongs to another ascending column. Every attempt to establish a "horizontal relationship" is, even today, declared to be "factional."

One could believe, in effect that we were in a military formation, where operational effectiveness implies both absolute obedience and secrecy, but also a drastic compartmentalisation of the units engaged in combat. This similarity has nothing ignominious about it. It recalls the periods when the Party had to adopt military forms of organisation and security in order to defend itself and act: the clandestinity of the Party of Lenin, of the Party during the Resistance, etc. Inasmuch as the conditions then justified measures of compartmentalisation, so the present conditions render them void, anachronistic, and sterile: not only for militants, but for the masses, and at the extreme, for the officials themselves.

By thus combining the military model of compartmentalisation with the model of parliamentary democracy, the Party cannot help reproducing--and strengthening--the bourgeois mode of political functioning. From the parliamentary model it draws a well-known advantage: just as the bourgeoisie achieves the reproduction of its forms of political domination through the free "citizens," so the Party leadership achieves the reproduction of its forms of domination through the militants. And from the military model of compartmentalisation it draws among others the not insignificant advantage that it can disguise the co-opting of officials as their election. As a result of this combination it obtains the reproduction not only of the form of the political domination of the leadership, but of the very body of the leadership.

In effect the narrow circles from which the leadership is drawn make it practically impossible to dislodge them, whatever their failures or even sometimes their political bankruptcy (for instance, the line of "legalisation" at all costs in the autumn of 1940). Under these conditions, the "game" of democracy in the Party culminates, as in the bourgeois State, in the miracle of transubstantia-

tion: just as the popular will is transformed into the power of the ruling class, so the will of the Party rank-and-file is transformed into the power of the leadership.

Have they considered the following fact? The counterpart of the mechanism which reproduces the leadership and enables it to survive, irremovable, through all its strategic and tactical turns--as through all its mistakes--is the flight of the militants. It is their continual haemorrhaging, their continual replacement by "new generations" who have not known the struggles and hardships of five, ten or twenty years ago, and who in their turn are thrown into the fray on the strength of "theories," slogans or promises, to be burnt up after a few years.

Why are there so many former Communists--more than even the official membership of the Party? Why are there so many card-carrying militants who have dropped out of active involvement? Why are entire generations of militants who have been tested in struggle (the Resistance, Cold War, Vietnam, Algeria, 1968, etc.) almost completely absent from the Party, both from its activity and at any level of leadership? The Party, as a little "State apparatus," has found the solution to the famous problem to which Brecht referred after the bloody riots in Berlin: "The people have lost confidence in their leaders? There is nothing for it but to elect a new people!" Periodically, from one recruitment campaign to the next, the Party leadership "elects" a new "people," in other words, another rank-and-file, other militants. But as for the leadership, it stays put....

Since we are talking about the "machine" and the state, we must also discuss ideology. For an ideology is needed to "cement" (Gramsci) Party unity.

On the one hand, this ideology rests on the membership's stirring faith in their leaders, who embody for them the unity and will of the Party, heir to the national and international revolutionary tradition. And behind this faith there is generally a class bond, which is expressed among the workers by the end of isolation; the warmth of collectivity in struggle, altogether different from the collectivity of exploitation; brotherhood; pride in the Party's existence as a conquest of the workers' class struggles; pride that they are led by workers like themselves; the assurances provided by this class leadership; etc.

But there are also warped forms of this faith, which abstracts from history and is expressed by a total and uncritical loyalty, and even by the expectation that the leadership will think for and instead of the membership: this abdication creates within the Party that category of blind sectarians who end up with only one reflex: to put all their passion, all their devotion, at the service of the leadership and its defense on all fronts ("the Party--that is, the leadership--is always right"). This type of blind faith is of course useful for all the thankless tasks as well as for all responsibilities. The leadership makes ample use of these people, rewarding their submission, but in fact encouraging the most narrow-minded conservatism.



On the other hand and concomitantly, this faith is exploited by an ideology expertly shaped and modeled by the leadership and its functionaries. The function of this Party ideology is to identify the unity of the Party with its leadership and with the line set by that leadership. Contrary to what one might believe, there is nothing spontaneous about this. This is the very ideology that corresponds to Party practice and justifies it.

Here we reach a decisive point for understanding what is happening in the Party....

### The Era of Official Platitudes

Need one reiterate how lamentable the state of Marxist theory in the French Party is? Not only has the Party inherited the old French working-class tradition which would not hear of theory, but after the deserving theoretical efforts of Maurice Thorez before the war, it settled down to its oars at the Stalinist slave galley and entered into the era of official platitudes (contributing a few of its own), which made Marxist theory, the international state dogma, into evolutionist positivism and dialectical materialism into the "science of sciences."...

But this infinitely precious practice [of concretely analyzing French society] has also disappeared from the Party. Maurice Thorez still had the courage, before the war, to put forward a concrete analysis of class relations in France. Since the war this tradition has gradually been lost....

It must be said that the leadership, on this question, is trying to break its own record. They think that people are stupid enough to take at face value a leadership which talks loud and long about change, democracy and freedom for a country which it does not govern and never has governed. Under these conditions, how can there be proof? Ah! The awesome words of Georges Marchais: "French Communists have never laid a hand on freedom"...but Frenchmen were all thinking: "Damn, they were never in a position to!" But on the other hand, can they really believe that the memory of this people is so short that it has forgotten the disdain for freedom and truth with which the leadership of the French Party broke and morally crushed men with the ignominy of accusations fabricated out of whole cloth to dishonor them: virtual "Moscow Trials" in France, lacking only the final executions, but a man can also be made to die of dishonor by torturing him with the accusation of being a "police agent," a "crook" or a "traitor"; by compelling all his old comrades-in-arms to unanimously condemn him, to renounce their past, to avoid and slander him. That is what happened in France between 1948 and 1965. The Communist Party was not in power; it had not "laid hands on French freedom"; no doubt that is why they say nothing to recall, regret or redress these abominations for which the leadership alone was responsible.

It is understandable that the Party leadership does not like concrete analysis. It is exacting and fertile, but it forgives noth-

ing. And since analysis implements theory, it is understandable that the Party does not like theory: when it is alive it is exacting and fertile, but it too forgives nothing....

One cannot leave it at the level of the Party, nor even at the character of its political practice: it is necessary to discuss the political relationship of the Party to the broad masses, therefore its political line, and the decisive question of political line: the question of alliances.

The existence of a party and a line is absolutely necessary to assist the working class to organise itself as a class, which is the same thing as organising its class struggle. However, just as we don't build the party for its own sake, one should not organise the working class for the working class, because that would lead to its isolation. The working class exists within a broad mass of exploited or oppressed working people; it is that part of the masses which is the most capable of organising itself and showing the way forward for all the exploited.

Marxist tradition considers that it is the action of the broad masses which is decisive, and that the action of the working class must be conceived in this light. It is from the broad masses that have come the historical initiatives of revolutionary scope: the creation of the Commune, the factory occupations in 1936, the popular conquest of the Liberation Committees in 1944-45, the immense surprise of May 1968 in France, etc. And a party judges itself primarily by its ability to link up with the needs and initiatives of the popular masses.

On this absolutely decisive question of a close relationship with the masses, the Party was able at one time to take a position. It is a tendency in its history. But there is also an opposite tendency which has continually reappeared and become more pronounced: an instinctive rejection of everything which is not under the control of the apparatus, of new forms which can upset certainties and the established order. This was the case in May '68: the Party deliberately cut itself off from the student and petty-bourgeois masses because it did not have control over them! In general, its instinctive fear of anything which it does not control from above, through its "theory" or its apparatus, means that it always starts off a good way behind when it does agree to move into action. It nevertheless carries in its portfolios, in advance, the truth about what is going to happen, when its first task should be to listen to the masses. Marx said: "Consciousness always lags behind." The Party leadership calmly applies this principle to the letter without suspecting its irony: it ensures its consciousness by lagging behind.

It is clear that, depending on the relationships which the Party maintains with the masses (living, attentive, open, or on the other hand, characterised by mistrust, deafness, and delay), so its political line will be conceived differently: broad and flexible while remaining correct; or, on the contrary, authoritarian and rigid, even if it is correct in the abstract. One can judge this on

the central question of any revolutionary line: the question of alliances.

All Marxist tradition, since the Communist Manifesto of 1848, has defended the necessity of alliances. The working class cannot conquer alone, its struggle would be a "funereal solo" (Marx).

But there are alliances and alliances. And here two conceptions/limits come up against each other. Either one conceives alliances in terms of a contract between political organisations seen as "proprietors" of their electorate; or else they are conceived in terms of a struggle led by the organised section of the working class in order to extend its influence.

In the first case, it is a question of applying a juridical and electoralist conception: this happened with the Union of the Left, ratified by a contract "from above." In the second case, we are talking about a conception which, while respecting pluralism and allowing for a juridical contract "from above," plunges the Party directly into the mass struggle to extend its audience and win broader positions--above all in the working class and petty bourgeoisie. The question is basically one of primacy: primacy of the contract, or primacy of struggle.

The leadership has of course declared that "the Union is a struggle," but one may well ask what the content of this formally correct slogan could be since the leadership, contrary to the position adopted in the perspective of the Popular Front in 1934-36, opposed the establishment of popular committees. In fact, in place of the struggle in the masses, to give the Union a real basis, the leadership substituted the struggle between organisations under cover of fidelity to the Common Programme. It thus succeeded in replacing unitary electoralism ("right opportunism") with a sectarian electoralism, which claimed to pass off the domination of one party over another as a real hegemony, a "leading influence" of the working class in the popular movement. But it was still electoralist--indeed, more so than ever--and therefore right opportunist. The leadership went so far as to launch an appeal to the masses after the drama of September ("Everything depends on you!"--Georges Marchais at the L'Humanité fête), so far as to use this astounding formula: "Make the first round of the elections into a gigantic 'national petition' for the updating of a good Common Programme and support for the Communists!"

What were they dreaming of, when from 1972 to 1977 nothing has been done to stimulate or develop rank-and-file initiatives and forms of unity between manual and intellectual workers. Indeed, any suggestion of popular committees has been rebuffed because of the risks of "manipulation." And then, having broken mass initiative over a period of years, they finally appealed to the masses. In order to prevent "manipulation," they ended up quite simply by manipulating the masses. At the final desperate appeal of the Party leadership, they wanted the masses suddenly to mobilise and transform their vote as citizens into a "petition" to support the "battle" led by the Party inside the Union of the Left!

That is what happens when one opts for a conception of the Union as a contract between leaderships and when one tries desperately to compensate for its effects by seeking to write in, at the last moment, struggle into the agreement. Electoralism is not avoided but worsened, and confusion is increased by an appeal for the mobilisation of the masses who have previously been kept aside from struggle.

It would however have been perfectly possible to conceive this policy of the Union as a policy of mass mobilisation and struggle: as a policy of popular unity, tying the contract signed "from above" to a unitary struggle at the base in which the Party could have extended its audience beyond the "buffer" [this refers to the stable, but limited, proportion of the electorate who vote for the CP].

In this case, one would have straightaway written the contract into the struggle and acted in such a way as to give priority to the unitary struggle of the masses. One would have had confidence in the masses to give short shrift to manoeuvres and manipulations, and stopped manipulating them--that is, treating them in fact as the object of a bourgeois practice--in order to create the conditions for a workers' and people's policy of popular unity.

The deep-rooted, stubborn and thoroughgoing mistrust shown by the leadership toward the masses ruled out this liberating choice for the Party. It fell back on a policy of agreement where the Union was run "from above." The Party literally did not wish to hear the slogan of "popular unity" which arose spontaneously from massive contingents of workers in the years 1973-75. There was a fear of taking risks, disguised as a fear of adventurism, or, in the last analysis, pure and simply routinism (who knows what reasons an apparatus would acknowledge!). The leadership withdrew into old habits as into a protective fortress, dragging the Party in with it. The left has lost; the fortress still remains, immutable, whatever the heavens hold....

### A Line of Popular Unity

To say a word on the subject which all bourgeois propaganda today mobilises against the Party--democratic centralism--it is clear that the membership will not fall into the trap. They will defend the principle of democratic centralism, not out of fetishism for the statutes nor attachment to the past for its own sake, but because they know that a party needs, in order not to become "like the rest," rules that differ from the rest, a freedom that bears no relation to bourgeois rights and is far richer than that. And they know that, if the Party is alive, it will, together with the masses, invent new forms of this freedom, without asking advice from experts in bourgeois democracy, be they Communists or not.

For our part, we can draw from this analysis working combat conclusions for the future: I present them in the form of a list, but the order of this list implies neither priority nor subordination. These measures are closely linked together, and we must set to work on all fronts simultaneously. We need, in effect, at all costs:

- 1) A Marxist theory brought to life....
- 2) A thorough critique and reform of the internal organisation of the Party and of its mode of functioning. The great debate undertaken by the Party ranks must involve the Party in a concrete analysis of the present rules of democratic centralism and of their political consequences. It is not a matter of giving up democratic centralism, but of renovating and transforming it, of putting it at the service of a mass revolutionary party, of preserving the identity and independence of that party with regard to the bourgeoisie.
- 3) A concrete analysis of the class situation in France....
- 4) The definition of a policy of an alliance of all popular and working-class forces, combining agreements at the top with the development of the Party's struggle at the base: a line of popular unity, without reformism or sectarianism, to actively mobilise the masses and the free development of their initiative.

Under these conditions, which I merely outline here, the Party can change, overcome all the hesitations and obstacles inherited from the past, redeem its mistakes and defeats and assist in bringing together the popular masses for what will finally be their victory.

THE DEATH KNELL OF EUROCOMMUNISM [excerpt]

by Jorge Semprun

[From Le Monde, 30 April 1978. Semprun was expelled, together with Fernando Claudin, from the Spanish CP in 1965 for what might be termed "premature Eurocommunism."]

Three times in the space of a little more than 20 years the Central Committee of the PCF has contributed to blocking a possibility for an opening and a renewal within the communist movement.

First in 1956, at the time that Khrushchev's secret report to the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party--despite its gross theoretical deficiencies--objectively opened the way for destalinization, for a new autonomy and for a new relationship with the masses.

Next in 1968, at the time that the May movement opened the possibility, through an undoubtedly complex process of a prolonged democratic breach, of overthrowing the political and social hegemony in France. On this occasion the attitude taken by the PCF leadership not only consolidated the power of the capitalist state, but it also prevented any concrete support to the democratic and socialist forces at work in Czechoslovakia. Its "rejection" or "disapproval" of the Russian intervention into Prague was nothing but empty words, since at that time the PCF's national strategy had the same backward significance as the USSR's armed diplomacy.

Today, for the third time, by unanimously approving Georges Marchais' incredible report, the PCF Central Committee confirms its arrogant blindness, its bureaucratic smugness, its historic choice of a strategy of disunion, atomization and demoralization of the left.

Historians will not fail to note the continuity of a political option, expressed through the persistence of a certain language. "Some people," said Thorez from the podium of the 14th Congress in July 1956, "have demanded constant discussion in the party on all questions without exception: as if we were a club, a debating society, and not a vanguard detachment of the working class, a party of action which is preparing itself for revolutionary tasks."

One could, of course, be ironical about these "revolutionary tasks" for which the party is ceaselessly preparing, free to forget them as soon as they become realizable. But the essential point is to note the degree to which Marchais' wooden language matches Thorez' language of 20 years ago.

"It is clear," says the current General Secretary of the PCF, "to anyone with a little common sense, that constant discussion is in the final analysis paralysis of decision and of action. We are a democratic party; we are not a discussion club." And Marchais warming to his theme: "The communist party is a revolutionary party, a vanguard party, and there are tendencies toward the cult of sponta-

neity, anarchistic tendencies to which we cannot bow under without renouncing the very existence of a party capable of playing its vanguard role."

...the decisions of the Central Committee of the PCF will have consequences and they will be weighty, not only for the evolution of the left in France, but also for its future in southern Europe. And, more concretely, for the communist parties of that region. In a word, the PCF's choice sounds the death knell, in time, of "Eurocommunism." This has, doubtless, not yet gone beyond the stage of formulations which are a little vague, declarations of intent. Yet it constituted a theoretical project--whose real practice remained to be discovered--of a new path which avoided the dead ends of social democracy as well as those of Stalinism.

NOTES ON EUROCOMMUNISM

by Joseph Seymour

The following notes arise out of a series of informal discussions in what was at the time the WV editorial board and a discussion at the PB meeting of 13 January 1978. These discussions revealed certain analytical differences over Eurocommunism.

1. An analysis of Eurocommunism must be placed in the context of the historic internal tendencies and contradictions of the mass Stalinist parties and their relation to social democracy, both in its political-ideological and organizational aspects.

With the adoption of "popular frontism" at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935, Trotsky concluded that no principled issue now separated the Stalinist from the social-democratic internationals and even projected their possible short-term fusion. See "The Comintern's Liquidation Congress," Writings, 1935-36.

However, from the Stalin-Hitler pact in 1939 through the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 the division between the West European Stalinist and social-democratic parties was harder than in the mid-1930's. Furthermore, in a number of important countries (France, Italy, Spain) the Stalinist organizations displaced the social democracies as the principal mass reformist party.

This raises two questions. Was Trotsky's prognosis of the social-democratization of the mass Stalinist parties correct? And, if so, why was this tendency held in check and in part reversed for approximately a generation?

2. Primary loyalty to the Soviet degenerated workers state is (except in the most exceptional conjuncture) fundamentally incompatible with the basic reformist desire to administer the capitalist state. For a reformist party to be allowed to administer the state apparatus, it must demonstrate unambiguous loyalty to the interests of its own bourgeois national state. That is why social-democratic parties can sometimes govern independently, while the Stalinist parties require a coalition with bourgeois elements to even have the possibility of a governmental role.

There is another factor making for the historic instability of Stalinist reformism as a mass phenomenon. Loyalty to a foreign state runs completely counter to prevailing bourgeois ideology. Thus loyalty to the USSR as the "socialist fatherland" is not, in contrast to affiliation to a mass reformist party, a political attitude which can be passively transmitted from one proletarian generation to the next. Unless the Soviet Union appears to the new proletarian generation as a progressive agency for socialism, the Stalinist parties cannot reproduce their cadre in the ideological sense. Thus the mass West European Stalinist parties are qualitatively more historically transient than the social-democratic parties.

3. The social-democratization of the Stalinist parties, predicted



by Trotsky in 1935, was delayed by the particular unfolding of World War II--the conquest of Europe by Nazi Germany, followed by the defeat of Germany primarily by the Russian army. The liberation of France, Italy, etc. in effect by the Red Army produced a strong pro-Soviet response among broad sections of the proletariat, extending even to sections of the petty bourgeoisie.

In addition, the Stalinists, where they had a mass base, were qualitatively more capable of waging an underground struggle against the Nazi occupation than were the social democrats. The Stalinists had a disciplined, centralist organization and a cadre which remained in large part a selection of the best elements of the 1914-21 proletarian generation. In France and Italy a large majority of class-conscious young workers, whose shaping political experience was the anti-fascist resistance, fought under Stalinist organization.

The victory of Franco's bonapartism in Spain created conditions somewhat analogous to World War II for the growth of the Stalinist party. The CP apparatus, materially supported by Moscow, was better able to organize under Franco's severe repression than the organizationally looser social democrats and anarcho-syndicalists. Furthermore, the Western bourgeois-democratic powers' alliance with Franco discredited Spanish social democracy among the proletariat in the late 1940's and 1950's.

4. The combined impact of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, the Hungarian Revolution and the Sino-Soviet split destroyed the moral authority of the "Soviet socialist fatherland" for the generation coming to political consciousness in the late 1950's-early 1960's. The important generational dimension of New Left radicalism and Western Maoism was empirically obvious and has long been recognized by our tendency. However, the more conventionally-minded young workers who adhered to the mass West European CPs in the late 1950's-early 1960's did not in general do so out of positive loyalty to the Soviet Union. Young workers joined or supported the French or Italian CPs because these were the mass political expressions of the working class, an attitude not qualitatively different from the young workers who adhered to the British Labour or Swedish social-democratic parties in this period.

Common elements in the development of international Maoism and of Eurocommunism are revealed in the evolution of two important Asian parties, the Communist Party (Marxist) of India and the Japanese CP. The CPI(M) was formed in 1964 as a major pro-Chinese split in the official party. However, in 1967 it broke with Peking largely over the latter's encouragement of a guerrillaist tendency (the Naxalites). Since then the CPI(M) has been a nationally-limited mass reformist party claiming the Stalinist tradition. During 1962-65 the Japanese CP supported China in denouncing "Khrushchevite revisionism," suffering a small pro-Soviet split in 1964 as a result. However, in 1966 the JCP leadership broke sharply with Maoism, denouncing Peking for fomenting ultra-leftism and for being excessively hostile toward the USSR. Today the Japanese CP is pridefully independent of both Moscow and Peking and is considered one of the major "Eurocommunist" parties.

5. The origin of Eurocommunism can be dated with the West European CPs' dissidence over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In 1956 the West European CPs supported the Soviet invasion of Hungary and as a result deepened the gulf between themselves and social democracy and also suffered small splits among their intellectuals and student-youth. In 1968 the West European CPs forestalled far larger splits by publicly denouncing the Soviet action. This marked the first time all of the principal West European CPs opposed the Soviet leadership in a major world crisis, although this meant lining up with imperialist public opinion. Particularly significant was the opposition of the French party, long regarded as a paragon of pro-Kremlin loyalism. The French CP's opposition to the Soviet invasion led to a rift in the party's leadership, with the hard-line, pro-Kremlin elements represented by Thorez' widow Jeanette Vermeersch, who resigned her party posts in protest.

With hindsight, it is clear that the Russian invasion of Dubcek's Czechoslovakia produced a significant shift toward anti-Sovietism among the West European Communists and left. This was motivated both by sympathy for Dubcek's liberalization and fear that the Kremlin bureaucracy would impose its will militarily on West Europe, including its Communist parties. Thus the Czech invasion destroyed what little sympathy the New Left radicals retained for "socialist Russia." The overthrow of the liberalizing Czech/Stalinist government by the Russian army did much to lay the subjective basis for a rapprochement between the West European CPs and U.S. imperialism.

Peking recognized that the Czech invasion had produced a marked anti-Soviet shift within the West European Communist parties and far-left milieu. Before 1968 Peking appealed to foreign Communists mainly from the left in the name of Cold War Stalinist orthodoxy and greater militancy. After Prague 1968 the Mao regime primarily appealed to anti-Soviet defensive nationalism. This represented the most important change in Chinese policy prior to the rapprochement with the U.S. in 1972.

The post-Prague, anti-Soviet backlash in the West European CPs and left generally was masked and delayed by the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War produced a broad and deep moral revulsion against the U.S. among the West European working class and student-youth, which even extended into the social democracies (Sweden). The Vietnam War limited the rightward motion in the West European CPs and workers movement generally. However, the end of the Vietnam War and a new American administration capable of giving its foreign policy a liberal image (Carter's "human rights") unlocked the tendency of the West European CPs to drift from Moscow to Washington.

6. Eurocommunism is a journalist's term invented to describe the dissidence of the West European CPs from Moscow and from Stalinist orthodoxy (e.g., the French CP's formally dropping the "dictatorship of the proletariat" from its program in early 1976). To the extent that the term gains popular currency and is adopted by the CPers themselves it tends to harden the division between the West European parties and Moscow.

The phenomenon labelled Eurocommunism is a phase in a historic tendency toward the social-democratization of the mass Stalinist parties. This tendency is not linear in time nor is it absolutely irreversible. However, the possible evolution of the relationship of the West European CPs to Moscow is not symmetric. A decisive break with Moscow can occur in the present international situation. For example, if the Italian CP achieves a governmental coalition with the Christian Democrats, this could well complete its transformation into a neo-social-democratic party, although this would undoubtedly involve a split with hard pro-Soviet elements. On the other hand, a return to the domination which the Soviet bureaucracy exercised over the West European CPs in the late 1940's-1950's would require a radical change in the world situation, on the order of Hitler's coming to power in 1933. For example, if an extreme right-wing militarist, like George Wallace, became U.S. president, this might qualitatively strengthen pro-Soviet elements in the West European CPs and workers movement generally.

A decisive break from Moscow by the French, Italian or Spanish CP would not be smooth and imperceptible. It would be signalled by a split as in Australia and Norway. In this sense the Lister split from the Spanish CP is too small to be considered decisive.

7. For the West European CPs to break decisively with Moscow would lead to a significant regroupment with sections of social democracy. Anticipations of this process have already occurred. The Union of the Left would have been extremely unlikely had the French CP supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1972 the majority of the left social-democratic Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity united with the CP. This fusion with genuine social democrats was only possible because of the Italian CP's distance from Moscow. In 1975 a majority of the Norwegian CP, inclusive of its central leadership, split to the right to unite with a left split from the mass Labor Party to form the left social-democratic Socialist Left Party. The present Norwegian CP is the small pro-Soviet rump.

While a decisive break with Moscow would remove the principal obstacle to the unification of the Communist and social-democratic parties, such a unification is not an inevitable outcome. Even discounting organizational vested interests, major differences might still separate the erstwhile Stalinist CPs from the traditional social-democratic parties. Many countries (e.g., France, Italy, Spain, Japan) have or have had more than one social-democratic party.

The narrow chauvinist policies of the French CP, for example, are organic and not simply a hypocritical way to push a pro-Soviet line. On a number of major issues (e.g., the Common Market) the French CP stands closer to the Gaullists than to Mitterrand's SP, which is more accepting of U.S. and West German hegemony in West Europe. Thus for the French CP to break with pro-Soviet loyalism would not necessarily lead to a fusion with the main body of social democrats.

NOTES ON THE CRISIS OF STALINISM

by John Sharpe

It is incontestable that the phenomenon baptized Eurocommunism is the product of the crisis of Stalinism predominantly in industrialized countries. The question in dispute is whether or not the Eurocommunist parties represent a new and contradictory historical stage (or phase) midway between Stalinism and social democracy, and by what criteria this question can be decided. The question, in short, is whether or not these parties can still properly be described as Stalinist.

Underlying comrade Seymour's "Notes on Eurocommunism" is the assumption that in defining the nature of the Eurocommunist parties, the state of their relations with the Soviet Union has an unequivocal primacy and that this question can be abstracted from developments in various national situations (e.g., May '68 in France, Italy 1968-69 or developments after the death of Franco in Spain). Comrade Seymour centrally explains the development of "Eurocommunism" only after 1968 by a "generation gap," i.e., that the younger members of the CPs no longer have any "positive loyalty" to the Soviet Union comparable to that which existed up to and immediately following World War II. While this assertion does not hold up empirically (where is the "generation gap" between Althusser and Marchais; between Claudin and Carrillo?), it is true that over half of the current membership of the French and Italian CPs has joined subsequent to the 1972-73 period (Union of the Left in France, "historic compromise" in Italy) and that the Spanish CP has increased its membership tenfold since Franco's death.

In addition to a number of what I believe to be incorrect assertions adduced to buttress the argument in Seymour's document, these assumptions are both insufficient to define Eurocommunism and are used in much too narrow and constrictive a fashion.

Origins of Eurocommunism

Seymour lays great stress on the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia as marking the birth of Eurocommunism. However, as he is forced to point out, the crisis of Stalinism goes back at least to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, if not to the formal adoption of "socialism in one country" at the Sixth Congress in 1928. It is not by accident that the main passages in which Trotsky projects the emergence of the centrifugal tendencies which have now taken the form of Eurocommunism came in response to the Sixth and Seventh Congresses, as well as to the Munich agreements of 1938: in short, to major turns or events which set the course of the Stalinist parties toward what is today Eurocommunism. The Eurocommunist parties are fundamentally correct in their repetitive insistence that their current positions derive in a linear fashion from the popular frontism of the 1930's and its subsequent versions during and following World War II.

The response of the French, Italian, Spanish and Japanese

parties to the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia had been building over a long period of time. 1968 would not have had the meaning it did without the famous Khrushchev report in 1956 (as well as the Hungarian Revolution and the uprising in Poland in the same year). Already in 1956, the Italian party evolved the concept of "polycentrism," a sort of Eurocommunism before the letter, based not only on the Khrushchev report, but on a secret Molotov report as early as 1953 (published in the Italian press in early 1978). The Italian party lost about 10 percent (i.e., about 200,000 members) of its membership in the year following 1956, and the hard pro-Moscow elements (Secchia, D'Onofrio, Scoccimarro, Roveda) were largely purged from the central party apparatus in the period 1956-60.

Splits in other parties cited by Seymour--Japan, India--also took place prior to 1968. And the important split in what might be termed the first Eurocommunist party, the Greek CP, took place in February-April of 1968, over the issue of the appropriate response to the 1967 colonels' coup. In Spain, the Carrillo leadership purged other "premature Eurocommunists," the grouping led by Claudin and Semprun, in 1964-65.

Thus the response of what were to become the "Eurocommunist" parties to the invasion of Czechoslovakia did not come out of thin air, although it did mark the first open criticism of the Russians by previously subservient parties, in particular the French party. In many other cases, however, criticism of the invasion was simply another step down an already well-trodden path. The question, therefore, is to evaluate the scope and significance of this criticism, and of subsequent developments in the past 10 years.

While sometimes harsh, when seen as a whole, "Eurocommunist" criticisms of the Soviet Union have been measured, partial and carefully selected and calculated so as to avoid a split with the Kremlin. Despite the shock of novelty, this was also evident in the immediate criticisms of the Czech invasion. Comrade Seymour points out that the hard-line pro-Moscow elements led by Thorez' widow objected to the French CP's criticism: he neglects to point out that the PCF also expelled Roger Garaudy, its leading theoretician at that time, for his insistence that the criticism of the Soviets did not go far enough. A similar dual polarization took place in Italy in 1956 around the question of "polycentrism."

Criticisms have most often been tailored for internal consumption (e.g., election campaigns). Thus the PCF's criticism of the Soviets' crackdown on dissidents has come over individuals either well known in the West or at a time when large-scale campaigns were having an effect on the French public (e.g., Rostropovich, Plyushch). But even in these cases, the PCF has also been quick to bury this criticism, for example, its suppression of a pamphlet containing a picture of PCF leader Juquin shaking hands with Plyushch. The "Eurocommunist" opposition to the PCF leadership has even taken to making gratuitous favorable references to Maurice Thorez' "theoretical contributions" to Marxism as proof of their orthodoxy! In addition, criticisms of the Soviet Union have been amply interspersed with

warnings of the dangers of anti-Sovietism, of Carter's imperialist "human rights" campaign, etc. (cf., the interview with Giancarlo Pajetta in this bulletin).

And even where it appears that the CPs have gone further--for example, on the question of NATO--they remain fundamentally in line with Soviet policy. The Common Program of 1972 foresees equal and simultaneous reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, but it is the Soviet-American policy of détente which dictates putting NATO and the Warsaw Pact on an equal plane, not some Eurocommunist break with the Kremlin. Soviet policy is directed at building a Europe which is "neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American" as PCI leader Giorgio Napolitano stated to Eric Hobsbawm:

"As you know, we are not raising the issue of Italy's unilateral withdrawal from NATO, even if the PCI eventually becomes part of the governing majority. We do not consider this a realistic objective. The real problem is to promote a relaxing of tensions, the effective affirmation of the spirit of détente and peaceful coexistence within each sphere and, in the last analysis, the elimination of Europe's division into military blocs."

--Napolitano, The Italian Road to Socialism  
Eurocommunism and Stalinism

On the one hand, comrade Seymour wants to define Eurocommunism as a new historical category, distinct from both Stalinism and social democracy, while on the other hand, tending to see the question of the CPs' subordination to the Kremlin or break from it as an either/or question, and implicitly equating a break from the Soviet Union as a break with Stalinism as such. But to define Eurocommunism as a new historical stage (or phase) amounts to using the term in a fashion parallel to what underlies the USec analysis: that Eurocommunism stands in relation to Stalinism on the one hand and social democracy on the other, as centrism stood between revolutionary politics and reformism. The fact is that while the Eurocommunist parties have refused to "submit" to the Kremlin's version of "proletarian internationalism," their criticisms have been modulated in order to avoid a clear and decisive break with the Soviet Union. Even in cases where it can be argued that these parties have decided to break with the Russians if necessary (e.g., the Spanish party), it is by no means clear that such a break has in fact occurred.

More importantly, the Spartacist tendency has always maintained that taken alone, the question of relations or even a break with the Soviet Union is not the single decisive criterion for defining Stalinism. Thus in the 1973 exchange with Gerry Clark, comrade Seymour gave two, obviously non-exclusive, criteria for judging an organization to be Stalinist:

"One is that the organization see itself in continuity with Stalin's Comintern and justify its practice by referring to Comintern examples.... The second criterion for a Stalinist

organization is programmatic advocacy of bureaucratic rule on the basis of collectivized property (although this is not how the Stalinists put it)."

--International Discussion Bulletin, No. 2, March 1974

The position that Stalinism is adequately described by the criterion of ties with the Kremlin bureaucracy was classically one of the excuses used by the Pabloists to claim that the Yugoslav and Chinese parties were not Stalinist after their break with the USSR or even, as in the case of the Chinese and Vietnamese, with Stalin's wishes.

If one objects that Tito and Mao remained Stalinists because they held their own state power, then one must logically exclude the possibility that any existing Stalinist party holding state power can turn "Eurocommunist." How then is one to explain the support--albeit cautious--of certain Eastern European parties for the Eurocommunists? The Yugoslav and Rumanian parties in particular have systematically tended to side with the Eurocommunists against the Kremlin and to a lesser degree the Polish and even Hungarian parties have taken their distance from the Soviet Union.

If open criticism of the Soviet Union is taken as the decisive touchstone, then one must logically conclude that the major European parties ceased to be Stalinist at least with their criticism of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, or possibly even earlier: the Italian party briefly criticized the Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956, although it later disappeared that fact, and it adopted the "Eurocommunist" conception of "polycentrism" after 1956. This is precisely the position expressed by Mandel when he states that with the reaction to the Prague invasion, "the experience of Stalinism, at least in its worst aspects, had been assimilated."

### Stalinism in One Country

It is impossible to separate the links which bind the mass Stalinist parties to the Soviet Union with their position in their own countries. The mass Stalinist parties are overwhelmingly associated by the working class with what has been their defining characteristic since the adoption of the Comintern's 21 Conditions and the split with social democracy: democratic centralism, Leninism, the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is significant that opposition to the "Eurocommunist" leadership has crystallized over these issues in both France and Spain. On the other hand, formal abandonment of these terms only codifies the practice of these parties for the last 40 years and may or may not be a decisive step, depending on cases: the Portuguese party formally abandoned the dictatorship of the proletariat in 1974, yet it remains notoriously Stalinist (including supporting the Czech invasion).

Thus the question of the tradition of these parties is more than these key phrases, more than just links to the Soviet Union. The Stalinism of these parties also crucially resides in these parties' relation to their own past. For these parties to truly break with Stalinism, they would also have to break with their own past,

not just with the Soviet Union. They would have to reject not so much the Moscow Trials (that would be relatively easy--one of the excesses of the cult of personality), but their support for the Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956, and the major purges carried out in their own parties: the 1952 Marty-Tillon purge and the 1961 Servin-Casanova purge in France, the major reshuffling in the Italian party to get rid of the hard-line Stalinists after 1956, the cliquist/bureaucratic purges of pro-Soviet elements in the Japanese party in 1961 and 1964 and of the pro-Peking elements in 1966, the 1964-65 purge of Semprun and Claudin in Spain, and so on. When challenged on his attitude toward past purges in the Spanish CP, Carrillo stated that he did not want to indulge in "cannibalism," e.g., attacking his own past. Such attacks or breaks would almost inevitably precipitate major splits in these parties.

It is totally incorrect to separate these two considerations. The mass Stalinist parties in particular are linked to their own national past. The French and Italian parties are the overwhelmingly dominant parties of the working class of their respective countries, the party of anti-fascist resistance (membership cards of the PCF issued immediately after the war bore the title "the party of the 100,000 shot"), the Spanish party was the only effective anti-Franco opposition, and so on.

The identity of the mass CPs is inextricable from their capacity to present themselves with some justification as "the party of the working class." This is also linked to the fact that in France and Italy especially, social democracy openly presented itself as the direct agent of the bourgeoisie in the post-war period: shortly after World War II in Italy, decisively on the Algerian question in the mid-1950's in France. This is the reason which explains comrade Seymour's statement that "in a number of important countries (France, Italy, Spain) the Stalinist organizations displaced the social democracies as the principal mass reformist party." Without this explanation comrade Seymour's statement hangs in the air: the Stalinists were able to displace the social democrats because they appeared as the defenders of class struggle and of proletarian revolution. There was and is a qualitative difference in the attitude of young workers who join the French, Italian or Spanish CPs from those who join the British Labour Party or Swedish Social Democrats. It is ludicrous to imagine James Callaghan uttering Georges Marchais' ringing defense of democratic centralism (at the PCF CC meeting at the end of April of this year), much less such a defense striking an approving chord in the mass of the party membership. In the late 1950's and 1960's, young workers in France, Italy or Spain joined the party of proletarian struggle and opposition to the bourgeoisie; in England and Sweden they joined a party in power or with every expectation of winning an election.

#### Social-Democratization

Rather than focussing on a delineation of Eurocommunism which stresses the historical continuity of these parties and the need for some decisive break before we can conclusively characterize their



nature, the picture Seymour paints (despite certain caveats) is one of a slow and gradual process of "social-democratization" of the Stalinist parties. Perhaps recognizing that this is the method used by the Pabloites to justify their adaptation to Eurocommunism, comrade Seymour attempts to make 1968 a crucial watershed and to invent other hypothetically decisive points, most of which he is simply wrong about. Thus he states:

"If the Italian CP achieves a governmental coalition with the Christian Democrats, this could well complete its transformation into a neo-social-democratic party, although this would undoubtedly involve a split with hard pro-Soviet elements."

But given the Italian CP's current course of practical coalition with the Christian Democrats (DC), how would the CP's actual entry into the government change anything? (The PCI was, after all, part of the government following World War II.) Furthermore, during the Moro affair, the CP was to the right of the DC and it was probably its influence which stopped the DC from negotiating with the Red Brigades. CP trade-union leader Luciano Lama has threatened to expell from the CP-dominated CGIL anyone who defends the centrists' capitulationist slogan, "Neither with the Red Brigades nor with the State," and is reported in fact to have expelled a significant number of its members in the port of Genova. This is the action of a Stalinist party, not a neo-social-democratic one. Further, it is highly dubious that the PCI's entry into the government would in fact involve a split at this point. As far as I can tell, the hard-line pro-Moscow opposition is reduced to largely ineffective sniping at the leadership.

Comrade Seymour reverses the logical political sequence of events when he states:

"For the West European CPs to break decisively with Moscow would lead to a significant regroupment with sections of social democracy. Anticipations of this process have already occurred. The Union of the Left would have been extremely unlikely had the French CP supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia."

The fact is that in particular instances it is the crisis of Stalinism and the CPs' commitment to a national perspective--i.e., their project of systematic ties with the social democracy--which could lead to the break with Moscow, not vice versa. Thus the Union of the Left has been a constant project of the French CP ever since the mid-1930's (with the exception of the height of the Cold War, for example, at the time of the anti-Ridgeway demonstrations in Paris in 1952). In fact, the conception of the "Union of the Left" has frequently been expanded to the "Union of the French People." The direct origins of the present Union of the Left go back to 1964-65, when the CP supported Francois Mitterrand's candidacy for president (Mitterrand was then the head of a bourgeois political formation). The question of Czechoslovakia certainly facilitated the formation of the Union of the Left, but (a) such a formation had been carefully prepared by the CP for years previously and (b) it was under the impact of the May events in France (e.g., the failure of Mendes-France and

the old SFIO to play any role at all) that the 1971 Epernay Congress was held, which saw Mitterrand's rise to power in the refounded SP (including changing its name from the SFIO--French Section of the Workers' International--to Socialist Party) based on a Union of the Left perspective. The question of Czechoslovakia cannot be separated from these developments. At most the PCF's criticism of the Prague invasion facilitated the Union of the Left, but the Union of the Left was clearly on the agenda even without it.

Thus Seymour's concrete arguments concerning the French and Italian examples are seriously flawed. The same is true of his characterization of the Indian CPI(M) and the Japanese CP. In India the development of the CPI(M) was indeed marked by its break from both Peking and Moscow (well prior to 1968, I might add), but today the CPI(M) while respectfully begging to differ with both Moscow and Peking, upholds the dictatorship of the proletariat, pays obeisance to Stalin himself and fulminates against class collaboration! Similarly, the development of the Japanese CP seems to be more the history of cliquist/bureaucratic struggles conducted in a classically Stalinist manner, rather than any qualitative evolution, although I don't believe we really have enough information for a detailed judgment about the Japanese party.

The flaws and outright errors in Seymour's document point to the structural problem in his argument. Namely that he abstracts from the historical context of the crisis of Stalinism in various countries in painting a picture of a gradual "social-democratization" while at the same time trying to make 1968 into the decisive date in order to reduce the question of Eurocommunism to that of open criticism of Moscow.

#### What is Eurocommunism?

The term "Eurocommunism" has been assigned a whole spectrum of meanings, from the attempt by bourgeois journalists and political analysts to indicate simply some degree of dissidence from the Soviet leadership's supposed commitment to "violent revolution," to the way in which it is generally used by the Pabloites, namely in an implicit analogy to centrism. Trotsky analysed centrism as a phenomenon standing between reformism and revolutionary politics; the USec in particular uses the term Eurocommunism to indicate a space between Stalinism and social democracy, thus raising the possibility that the Eurocommunist parties are no longer Stalinist. While the USec majority now appears to be retreating on this question, one of its repeatedly stated positions is that the Eurocommunists (or some wing of them) somehow represent a left option with respect to the traditional Stalinists. This is the reasoning which underlies the USec's recently announced major shift in orientation to a concentration of the Eurocommunist wings of the CPs.

Eurocommunism is part of the crisis of Stalinism, the unstable disintegration of Stalinist parties. Tied not only to the Soviet Union, but to their own history and past practices and positions, these parties represent a national communist option within the frame-

work of Stalinism. There has been no qualitative break in their historically Stalinist continuity, despite piecemeal criticism of the Soviet Union.

In some cases (e.g., Spain), the leadership appears committed to break with the Soviet Union and with its own past if necessary (although Carrillo's rejection of "cannibalism" is indicative of his reluctance to do this) to satisfy its appetites, this commitment has yet to be tested. In countries where there has already been a split (e.g., Greece, Norway, Sweden, Britain), the "Eurocommunist" formations may be taking the road of the CP of Australia and becoming neo-social-democratic formations.

However, the question of "reversibility" remains open. In 1950 no one would have predicted Tito's reconciliation with the Soviet Union; today a reconciliation between the Chinese and the Soviets does not appear likely. Yet the Dutch party, after several years of "Eurocommunism," has recently returned to a pro-Soviet stance. While it now appears virtually excluded that the Western CPs would return to the same submission vis-a-vis Moscow as in the 1930's, it is entirely possible that a breakdown of détente would again bring the Eurocommunists' policies into greater consonance with those of the Soviet Union. It is significant that both the Italian and French parties backed off from fully supporting Carrillo against the Soviet attacks on him in 1977. The possibility of a shift away from Eurocommunism is most obvious in the case of the French party. The PCF's policy in the six months prior to the March 1978 elections and in the discussions in the PCF since then (threats of expulsion of dissidents which may well be carried out) indicate a retreat from a more open form of "Eurocommunism."

Before clearly stating that these parties represent a new historical phase which is qualitatively different from their Stalinist past, we must therefore await a decisive historic test, which may be different with different parties, but will almost certainly involve splits in the parties in addition to decisive breaks both with their past and with Moscow.

--1 June 1978

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON EUROCOMMUNISM

by Joseph Seymour

"Notes on Eurocommunism" (28 March 1978) has an historic-analytic character, rather than being a precise statement of counterposed positions on the disputed questions. In addition, the Ninth Congress of the Spanish CP this April marked a fundamental evolution of the Eurocommunist tendency, producing a qualitative differentiation, for the present, between the Spanish CP on the one hand, and the French and Italian CPs on the other. Also the Spanish CP Congress demonstrated that the statement in "Notes on Eurocommunism" that a decisive break with Moscow "would be signalled by a split" was too categorical. This aspect of the "Notes" requires rectification.

The following is an attempt to provide a succinct statement of the most important questions under dispute:

1. The political phenomenon labeled Eurocommunism is a phase in the historic tendency toward the social-democratization of the mass Stalinist parties, a tendency projected by Trotsky in the 1930's.
2. The French and Italian CPs are no longer unconditional supporters of the Soviet regime. In particular, they are likely to oppose or dissent from Soviet policy when the latter affronts bourgeois-democratic popular opinion in the West (Czechoslovakia 1968, Portugal 1975, Soviet dissidents). Thus, the relation of the French and Italian CPs to the Soviet government is qualitatively different from in the past and qualitatively different from that of the present Kremlin-loyal CPs (e.g., Portuguese, Greek [Exterior], American).

At the same time, the French and Italian CPs continue to stand for the general contours of Soviet foreign policy and are not yet positively disloyal to the Russian Stalinist bureaucracy. The French and Italian CPs can be characterized as increasingly dissident allies of the Soviet bureaucracy.

Prior to its Ninth Congress the Spanish CP was qualitatively similar to the French and Italian parties. Its repudiation, at the Ninth Congress, of its self-designation as Leninist represented both a statement of complete independence from the Soviet bureaucracy and an affirmation of social-democratic ideology. Therefore, the Spanish CP can no longer be characterized as a Stalinist party.

3. The Eurocommunist tendency is not in the present period qualitatively reversible. The French and Italian CPs can, like the Spanish, break decisively from Moscow given the present international situation. Such a development might be precipitated, for example, by the full-scale entry of the Italian Communists into a governmental coalition with the Christian Democrats. On the other hand, a reversion by the French and Italian CPs to the status of Kremlin-loyal parties (as they were in the 1950's) would require a world-historic change in the European political situation, on the order of Hitler's coming to power in 1933. An analogous development would be the accession to the U.S. presidency of an extreme right-

EUROCOMMUNISM, HELSINKI AND CARTER'S "HUMAN RIGHTS" CRUSADE

by Reuben Samuels

My thinking on Eurocommunism was strongly shaped by preparing an internal educational on Eurocommunism given on 4 March 1978. The class centered on a critique of the USec majority's line, especially as expressed in two documents: "Three Facets of Euro-Communism," by Ernest Mandel in Intercontinental Press (23 May 1977) and "Socialist Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" which appeared in Intercontinental Press (25 July 1977). Viewing Eurocommunism through the lens of a polemic against Pabloism, what struck me about the Seymour document was his overlooking of the importance of both Chile and Portugal, and of Helsinki and Carter's "human rights" crusade in the development of Eurocommunism. For if today's Eurocommunist bureaucrats identify with Dubcek and plan to defend themselves from his fate under the "democratic" protective shield of NATO, it is in part because of the disastrous ends met by the more Kremlin-loyal Corvalán and Cunhal and the opening to Washington provided by Helsinki and Carter's "human rights" crusade.

Even Mandel, for whom Eurocommunism is ultimately progressive, recognizes that the West European CPs "learned" social-democratic "lessons" from Chile. "Curb the workers' mobilizations, even if this divides the toilers and demoralizes entire layers of the proletariat" ("Three Facets"). After the September [1973 Chilean] coup [Italian CP leader] Berlinguer was involved in a serious automobile accident, and it is reported that he used the period of his convalescence to brood about the fall of Allende. This brooding rapidly spread to the leaderships of many West European CPs as the wreckage of Chilean Stalinism arrived in the respective countries seeking asylum from Pinochet's terror. Ironically in the capital of NATO-protected Italian bourgeois democracy and of heterodox Stalinism, in Berlinguer's political backyard of Rome, the Chilean Unidad Popular (UP) set up its "government in exile."

The West European CPs drew the following lessons from the Chilean UP experience: 1) Allende's "peaceful road" was not peaceful enough, his program insufficiently minimalist, his repression of the workers insufficiently ruthless, his courtship of the bourgeois officer corps insufficiently solicitous, his anti-Yankee-imperialism rhetoric too strident; Allende himself, as something of an "ultra-leftist" romantic adventurer whom Corvalán unfortunately got tied up with. 2) Allende's UP was seen as having too narrow a bourgeois base. The classical popular front, where the CP comes to power with what Trotsky called the "shadow of the bourgeoisie," a few emigré politicians or liberal lawyers, as the guarantors of the bourgeois character and program of the government, was no longer adequate. Instead appeal must be made to the entire national bourgeoisie as a class including its reactionary, clerical and even monarchical elements. This lesson was engraved into the reformist consciousness of the Spanish CP long ago when its own popular-front debacle led to the Francoist white terror. Thus the PCE carries not the red flag, not even the flag of the republic, but the national flag adopted under Franco. Its Junta Democrática included not only bourgeois and

wing militarist (like George Wallace), who directly and immediately threatened bourgeois democracy in Europe.

4. A split cannot be considered the sole, self-sufficient criterion to judge when a given CP has decisively broken with the Soviet regime. Such a judgment must be based upon a several-sided analysis of the party in question. A definitive break with the Soviet regime would meet the opposition of Kremlin-loyal elements, undoubtedly leading eventually to the split of these elements.

5. For the mass CPs of Western Europe a decisive break with the Soviet bureaucracy is tantamount to losing their character as Stalinist parties, regardless of whether such a break is associated with a formal renunciation of the party's history and ideological traditions.

--4 June 1978

right-wing nationalist forces, but even the monarchists. The Italian CP appealed to the main party of the Italian bourgeoisie, the Christian Democrats through the "historic compromise" in exchange not even for ministerial portfolios but for the threadbare cloak of bourgeois "responsibility." It gave the Christian Democrats its parliamentary spoils. The PCF made an opening to the more nationalist wing of the bourgeoisie, the Gaullists, by adopting its foreign policy including the "force de frappe." 3) Another lesson learned from Chile is the avoidance of confrontation with U.S. imperialism. If the CP was to share with its bourgeoisie in political power then it had better have, if not the support, then at least the benign neutrality of Washington. The Helsinki conference in August 1975 and Carter's "human rights" campaign provided the larger West European CPs with what they perceived to be as an opening which was immediately seized at the expense of abandoning such "outdated phrases" as "proletarian internationalism" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Critical distance from the Kremlin became the norm as each party pledged to defend its own national bourgeoisie against "foreign intervention," meaning the Warsaw Pact forces.

The Portuguese revolution followed on the heel of the Chilean coup, and the PCE and PCI felt immediate kinship with the U.S. State Department's man in Lisbon, Soares, against the Kremlin's Cunhal. Along with the Rumanian and Yugoslav CPs, the PCE and PCI would send delegations to the PSP congress but not to those of the PCP. The PCF retained formal solidarity with the PCP but could not help but feel as uneasy as the PCI and PCE at Cunhal's attacks on bourgeois democracy and his attempt to find a bourgeois bonapartist shortcut to power.

As we stated in "From Yalta to Helsinki...The Diplomacy of Betrayal," WV No. 77, 19 September 1975: "It would not be a great surprise if, when the contents of the secret Ford-Brezhnev talks are made known, it will turn out that the fate of Portugal was on the poker table at Helsinki." Thus the post-World War II status quo in Europe was ritualistically resanctified only when it was challenged again by revolution in the Iberian peninsula. But it was the so-called Basket Three Agreement at Helsinki, the public concessions wrung from the USSR by Ford and the other Western imperialist powers and exploited by Carter's "human rights" campaign which has received most of the subsequent attention. For these were clauses governing certain democratic rights such as free movement of ideas, information and persons which the Western imperialist powers hoped to exploit to provide a democratic cover for their drive to reconquer East Europe and Russia for the capitalist market place.

In the aftermath of Helsinki, the once "hard" Kremlin-loyal PCF sent its boss, Marchais, to Rome to ratify in November 1975 a communiqué with Berlinguer which was but an echo of Helsinki's Basket Three and was similar to a PCI/PCE pact signed on the eve of Helsinki. Among other things it pledged the parties to "freedom of thought and expression, of the press, of assembly, of association, of demonstration, of the free circulation of persons at home and abroad, for the inviolability of private life, for religious freedom." Later

in November the PCF signed a similar pact with the arch-Eurocommunist-to-be, Carrillo.

Helsinki inspired certain Soviet dissidents to appeal directly to U.S. imperialism to apply "democratic" pressures on the USSR. In November 1975 these dissidents began to receive the support of even the PCF. On 12 November L'Humanité denounced the denial of an exit visa to Sakharov to collect his Nobel Peace prize. Not long after that, in early January 1976, Marchais went on a TV talk show and announced that the PCF was dropping the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat." To show that he was not about to break the continuity of Stalinist "democracy" inside the party, Marchais then convened the 22nd Congress to ratify his TV pronouncement.

A few weeks later in an unprecedented snub Marchais announced he was not going to the 25th Congress of the CPSU because of the "divergence between our two parties on the problems of socialist democracy" and "on the evaluation of French foreign policy" (L'Humanité, 28 February 1976). At the same time, to demonstrate that his party was not a church whose pope resides in the Kremlin, Carrillo stayed away, going to Rome (!) instead of Moscow. Berlinguer did attend the Congress and gave "greetings" in which he said that his party worked for a foreign policy "which within the framework of the international alliances of our country [i.e., NATO and the EEC] would make an active contribution to détente and would firmly defend the sovereignty of the Italian people against any foreign interference in our internal affairs" (L'Unità, 28 February 1976).

In mid-June of 1976 on the eve of Italian parliamentary elections, Berlinguer made the famous statement that he felt a lot safer building "socialism" under the benign shield of NATO where he would never suffer the fate of a Dubcek. With 33.7 percent of the vote in his pocket Berlinguer went off to the Berlin conference of European CPs. As Radio Free Europe professional anti-communist Kevin Devlin demonstrates in "The Challenge of Eurocommunism" (Problems of Communism, January/February 1977), the CPSU bureaucrats had tried to convene such a conference concurrent with Helsinki which would endorse a ringing proclamation of Kremlin-loyal "proletarian internationalism" and even perhaps smuggle in a pot shot at China. Instead the Eurocommunist parties-to-be, combined with the Yugoslav and Rumanian CPs, forced a postponement several times until the Russian bureaucrats were willing to settle for a limp endorsement of non-interference and what amounted to "peaceful coexistence" and "détente" amongst CPs as if they were already trying to settle a shooting war.

Therefore, the Kremlin bureaucrats have accepted Eurocommunism the way they have accepted a lot of things they do not necessarily like as the lesser evil. Insofar as these parties do not directly attack us, we will not directly attack them. Therefore, the "diplomatic" Berlinguer got his speech at the CPSU 25th Congress published in full in Pravda while Carrillo was muffled at the "celebration" of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow.



The Russian bureaucracy is committed to a capitalist Western Europe in order to preserve its own bonapartist rule. The PCI is crucial to the survival of a capitalist Italy. The PCF and PCE are more expendable in this regard. As a consequence Berlinguer's "diplomacy" is reciprocated both in the pages of Pravda and through various Soviet business transactions which use the PCI as an intermediary. The PCF often gets short shrift and not only polemically. Thus during the last French presidential elections, the CPSU general secretary paid Giscard d'Estaing a timely visit while snubbing the PCF leader.

The Kremlin bureaucrats accept "Eurocommunism" the way they accept the division of Germany at Helsinki or Tito's Yugoslavia. That is, they accept it as a means to preserve the existing status quo. The cynical myopia in pursuit of their narrow self-interest of the Soviet bureaucracy is not the lens through which we judge the West European CPs. In 1939 Trotsky wrote:

"The growth of imperialist antagonisms, the obvious proximity of the war danger, and the equally obvious isolation of the USSR must unavoidably strengthen the centrifugal nationalist tendencies within the Comintern. Each one of its sections will begin to evolve a patriotic policy on its own account. Stalin has reconciled the Communist parties of imperialist democracies with their national bourgeoisies. The stage has now been passed. The Bonapartist procurer has played his role. Henceforth Communo-chauvinists will have to worry about their own hides, whose interests by no means always coincide with the 'defense of the USSR'."

--"A Fresh Lesson," Writings, 1938-39, p. 71

World War II only allowed Stalinism to merge "defense of the USSR" with defense of the imperialist democracies. But in 1978, in a period of renewed cold war rhetoric and NATO sabre-rattling in Washington, we see not the reconstitution of the Cominform, not a new Zhdanov line but the CPs with mass bases abandoning even the pretense of "proletarian internationalism" for Carter's "human rights" anti-Soviet crusade. Of course these parties are ultimately more loyal to their own bourgeoisies, with whom they hope some day to share power, than to U.S. imperialism. Alliances between their own bourgeoisies and the Soviet Union may aid them in the rediscovery of the "defense of the USSR." But they have all made explicit loyal pledges to defend their own national bourgeoisies and their allies (e.g., NATO) against the Warsaw Pact forces if such a conflict arises. A whole new generation of Stalinist bureaucrats not necessarily selected by the Kremlin are training and selecting their party membership in part on the basis of anti-Sovietism, either of the "diplomatic" pro-NATO Berlinguer variety, or the left-Gaullism of Marchais ("if there were aggression against France by the Soviet Union, which is unthinkable, we would be the first to defend our national territory") or the reformed-Francoist third-campism of Carrillo. In this period of heightened imperialist anti-Sovietism to believe these parties retain a shred of Soviet defensism (unless it is subordinated to some inter-imperialist conflict in which their own bourgeoisie forms an alliance with the USSR) is indeed dangerous.

IS EUROCOMMUNISM THE END OF EUROPEAN STALINISM?

by Jan Norden

For the past two and a half years, more or less, there has been a running debate, among bourgeois political analysts and socialist tendencies of every hue, over "Eurocommunism." The phenomenon under discussion is quite elusive, since several of the protagonists have denied the very existence of Eurocommunism and there is no commonly agreed body of doctrine defining it. Lacking above all are decisive acts: the key French and Italian parties have held back from crossing the Rubicon of a fundamental break with the Kremlin.

Following an analytical dispute over a draft article on the book by Spanish Communist Party (PCE) leader Santiago Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State, and an initial round of discussion at a January Political Bureau, the discussion was opened by comrade Seymour's document, "Notes on Eurocommunism." In his text Seymour writes that "The phenomenon labelled Eurocommunism is a phase in a historic tendency toward the social-democratization of the mass Stalinist parties." This document also presents a generational analysis arguing that the 1968 Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia produced a mass anti-Soviet consciousness in the European working class. In discussions he has argued that after this turning point it is essentially a question of time until the CPs adapt to this and finally break with Moscow.

Certainly Eurocommunism is not a new historic category at the same level as Stalinism and social democracy, and as we have written in WV it is part of the process of social-democratization of the mass CPs in the advanced capitalist countries. But is this loose category --actually a journalistic term--the final phase in this process? Already there is significant differentiation between the Spanish, French and Italian CPs, and the more daring are proclaiming the "death of Eurocommunism." The word was coined to cover various CPs that had raised common criticisms of repression in the Soviet Union. However, there is a qualitative distinction between being dissident parties still within the Moscow Stalinist orbit and actually breaking with the Kremlin--which in this case would mean ceasing to be Stalinist. It is possible that the French and Italian CPs will continue to hold back in the present period from such a definitive break, in which case Eurocommunism will turn out to be a temporary convergence between highly dissident, residually Moscow-allied Stalinists and elements (such as Carrillo) bent on a split.

The selection of 1968 as a key turning point is a post-dating proposed by those--like Carrillo--who have most actively sought to build a Eurocommunist current: it was the earliest point at which the prospective allies took a common position against the Kremlin on a major question. But the Italian Communist Party (PCI) became "dissident" much earlier, in the late 1950's, when it began talk of "polycentrism" and opposed the break with China. The French Communist Party (PCF), on the other hand, while it criticized the 1968 Czech invasion did so only in mild terms and expelled a political bureau member, Roger Garaudy, for virulently attacking the Kremlin. It was

not until late 1975 that the PCF began ostentatiously and repeatedly denouncing repression of Soviet and East European dissidents while signing a joint policy statement with the PCI.

It is significant that the new generation of West European workers is not strongly loyal to the Soviet Union. However, this is by no means the only or even the principal pressure on the mass CPs of West Europe to break with Moscow. The broad layer of young leftists in Europe does not have firm loyalties, which are forged by decisive events such as the Russian Revolution or the anti-Nazi resistance. During the period of the Vietnam war the dominant mood in the European left was opposition to U.S. imperialism and solidarity with the Vietnamese DRV/NLF, with very little hostility to the Kremlin. As we have written in WV, the only West European country where there is deep-rooted mass anti-Sovietism in the working class is West Germany.

So what can we say about Eurocommunism? First, that it is part of the historic tendency toward social-democratization of the mass Stalinist parties. Trotsky pointed out in the late 1930's that the reformist parties of the Stalintern had a dual social basis: Kremlin subsidies and imperialist superprofits, and that with time the latter loomed increasingly larger than the former. This has in fact occurred, and thus it is absurd to pretend (as does the SWP) that Eurocommunism represents nothing new or even (dixit OCI) that it is a new form of Browderism carried out with the OK of the Soviet bureaucracy. From "polycentrism" to "Eurocommunism," dissent by the European CPs from the Moscow line has been an expression of this tendency to remove remaining potential contradictions in the Stalinist reformists' support for their "own" bourgeoisie.

Second, that a definitive break with the Kremlin by the mass West European CPs would only come about in response to great events, such as a new Hungary '56 or Czechoslovakia '68. Moreover, not all such decisive events point in the same direction. Some, such as a successful rightist/bonapartist coup, would actually reverse the tendency toward a break from Moscow, by throwing exiled CP leaders on the Kremlin's mercy. (And an anti-Communist military coup with fascist support is not at all impossible in Italy, as PCI leader Berlinguer himself argued in justifying his strategy of "historic compromise" with the Christian Democracy.) Seymour's "Notes" suggest the likelihood that, after 1968, the PCF and PCI could cease to be Stalinists through a gradual unfolding of the process of social-democratization, with events as tranquil as CPs entering a government being sufficient to tip the balance. The character of mass parties is not so lightly changed, however.

Third, that the passage from Stalinist heterodoxy to social democracy would consequently provoke substantial splits in the cadre and ranks of the mass European CPs. As would be expected given their origins and historical development, both the PCF and PCI have significant sectors of the apparatus and top leadership who oppose a definitive break from Moscow, and there is significant residual attachment to the Soviet Union at least among older Communist workers. A desire to avoid such a split, which could seriously weaken CP electoral strength (ergo, bargaining power in a coalition government),

is a factor tending to hold back a break with the Kremlin until the issue is forced by great events.

Fourth, that whether or not the process of social-democratization culminates in a split from the Soviet bureaucracy in the present period depends in part on the orientations of the European bourgeoisies. It is not a foregone conclusion that every bourgeoisie would at any given moment be virulently anti-Soviet. Both the French and Spanish popular fronts in the 1930's, for instance, were based in part on the desire of at least a section of the bourgeoisie for an alliance with the USSR. In the coming period of increasing interimperialist rivalries, a Gaullist-Soviet entente directed against a U.S.-British-German Atlantic alliance is not out of the question. This would put considerable pressure on the PCF to mend its fences with Moscow.

In Italy, Washington would probably order its vassals to oppose PCI entry into the government, thus splitting the Christian Democracy; the remaining sector would most likely be based on the state-owned industries (such as the ENI oil company)--a huge source of patronage--which for years have benefited from huge Soviet supplies and contracts. Here, too, consummation of the "historic compromise" may not require that the PCI break with Russia; in fact, an Italian government facing German monetary blackmail and American military pressure may prefer a pro-Soviet Communist Party.

In a renewed cold war atmosphere Washington will not trust "Euro-communist" CPs in Western governments and will do whatever it can to keep them out (as Kissinger argued consistently and Carter now agrees). Unless, of course, the European CPs are willing to go beyond support for their "own" bourgeoisies to become actively pro-U.S., which none of them (except for Carrillo's PCE) have given any signs of doing. Thus in a direct Soviet-U.S. military confrontation in the Near East the European bourgeoisies might well remain neutral, which would tend to arrest the CPs' tendency to break from Moscow.

Fifth, and more generally, the possibility of a break from the Soviet bureaucracy by the European Communist parties in the present period rests not only on their desire to deepen their ties with the imperialist bourgeoisies but also on a willingness of those bourgeoisies to integrate the CPs fully into the imperialist states. What kept the CPs loyal to Moscow for so long was not only the workers' distant memories of the October Revolution and the more recent experience of anti-Nazi resistance struggles--as well as Kremlin subsidies--but also their enforced isolation as a result of the cold war. In the 1950's and 1960's the PCI and PCF had no chance to break out of the "ghetto." In the case of the PCI, the social/economic/political crisis of Italian capitalism has reached the point that large sectors of the capitalist class now seem prepared to take this step. However, in France the PCF was forced to put on unaccustomed "militant" airs during the last election campaign in the face of concerted efforts by the bourgeoisie and Mitterrand to raid its electoral base and keep Marchais & Co. from exercising real influence in a Union of the Left government. If the French bourgeoisie is not going to protect the PCF by allowing it to feed off and root itself in the

capitalist state apparatus up to the highest levels, then the Communist bureaucrats will hesitate to break from their previous patron, the Kremlin.

This is the same concern which the PCI voiced in pressing last winter for a formal coalition: that whether or not it had direct participation in the cabinet this time around, it must be recognized as a potential governing party "just like any other." And it is notable that those CPs in the advanced capitalist countries which have remained staunch Kremlin loyalists are the ones which have been excluded from the parliamentary game and/or subjected to repression: the CPUSA, which has not recovered from the McCarthyite period; the German DKP, outlawed until the late-1960's; or the Greek EKE (Exterior) and Cunhal's PCP, both of which have recently emerged from clandestinity and could be forced underground again at any moment.

In summary, during the last year most European commentators and now even some of the more obtuse American bourgeois analysts have noted that differences between the Eurocommunist parties appear more active than the similarities. Beginning with the refusal by Berlinguer and Marchais to make a joint declaration attacking Soviet repression of dissidents at the "Eurocommunist summit" in Madrid (which was generally seen as a failure) in March 1977; to Berlinguer's public disagreement with Carrillo over the nature of the Soviet Union (the PCI still calls it socialist) at the time of the Moscow New Times attack on the PCE leader (June 1977); to the PCF's dispute and subsequent split with Mitterrand's Socialists (September 1977, March 1978)--pointedly criticized by both the PCE and dissidents inside the French party--the Eurocommunists have had great difficulties in forging a common tendency. The fundamental reason is that they operate on different national terrains, and if there is not an explicitly defined Eurocommunist movement today it is largely because there does not exist a Eurobourgeoisie.

The question is whether Eurocommunism represents the final stage (or phase) in the social-democratization of the mass Stalinist parties of the imperialist countries. Are we in end game and it is only a question of when the official stamp is put on the break with Moscow, as Carrillo's PCE just did? Seymour holds that this is the case, basing himself on a generational analysis of the European working class. The Mandelites hold a similar position (or at least did so until the last few weeks, when they have begun to refer to the CPs as already non-Stalinist and talk of entry), alleging that Eurocommunism is a response to a new period of worldwide imminent revolution which opened with 1968. This ignores the fact that changes in the character of a mass party come through major defining political battles, not by gradual evolution. The only way such analyses can deal with the possibility of a significant further postponement of the final break is to ignore the question (Seymour talks only of a reversion to 1950's-style unquestioning subordination to the Kremlin, which would indeed require a presently unforeseeable world-historic event) or to refer to "outside" factors. Yet it is only in response to such major events that a definitive rupture will come about.

Taking all the above factors into account, however, it is clear that the mass European CPs have gone a very long way toward ceasing to be Stalinist--that special kind of reformist party whose support for the bourgeois order derives in part from subordination to the anti-revolutionary interests of the bureaucratic rulers of a degenerated/deformed workers state--and instead becoming a classical bourgeois workers party, which we designate as social-democratic. We are near the end of the process begun with the passage of the Comintern to defense of the bourgeois order, signalled by Hitler's unopposed march to power (1933) and codified by the popular front and the Comintern's "liquidation congress" (1935). Already the Spanish PCE, as discussed below, has formally declared its independence of the Kremlin at its recent Ninth Congress; before that the Greek EKE (Interior), the Australian CP and the large Japanese CP had broken with Stalinism. The Italian PCI is quite far advanced on this road, but has been so for some time and will probably avoid an open rupture with Moscow until forced by world events. Marchais' PCF, after being burned by the blow-up of the Union of the Left, appears to be retreating into the "ghetto" and may spin off a social-democratic wing; but even then a return by the PCF to Cunhal/Thorez-style rigid Kremlin orthodoxy is not in the cards.

After being postponed by the expansion of Stalinism after World War II and the subsequent quarantine of the Western CPs during the Cold War, the crisis of Stalinism is now in full bloom. It is important to see Eurocommunism in this context, for even the spread of dissidence within the Moscow Stalinist camp has greatly encouraged oppositional tendencies in the Soviet bloc. A final break with the USSR could have explosive consequences in Eastern Europe, which is why Brezhnev et al. are so conciliatory toward all but the most deliberately provocative Eurocommunists (Carrillo). On the other hand, a new Red Army invasion in Eastern Europe would seal the coffin of West European pro-Moscow Stalinism, which is why the Kremlin literally bought off the Polish strikers in 1970 and 1975 by stuffing their mouths with Russian meat. Thus even though Eurocommunism is a rightist political phenomenon, its appearance opens important opportunities for Trotskyists, not only in the West, where CP militants are now forced to confront the question of Stalinism head-on, but also in East Europe and the USSR. In fact it is quite possible that revolutionary struggles could break out in East or West Europe before the social-democratization of the West European Stalinist parties is completed.

#### The Spanish PCE

A look at the development of the Spanish Communist Party over the last two decades will shed light on differences between it and the PCF and PCI, explaining why it (aside from the Japanese CP) is the only one of the principal Eurocommunist parties that has so far sought an open break with the Kremlin. Its evolution began with the realization in the late 1950's that even anti-Francoist sectors of the bourgeoisie would not repeat the experience of the 1930's popular front, which was only a desperate last-chance move to stave off proletarian revolution and thoroughly frightened even the most left-wing

capitalist politicians. So it came up with the formula of "national reconciliation," in which the divisions of the Civil War would be "overcome" and the PCE would be the fifth wheel of a broad coalition of all but die-hard Francoists. (Today Carrillo is pushing the same policy under the name of a "government of national concentration.")

In order to assuage the bourgeoisie it was necessary to give even more than the normal guarantees of reformist commitment to preserving capitalist rule. Not only was the PCE tied to Moscow, but the bourgeoisie had bitter memories of the way in which the Kremlin set up its own state apparatus within Republican Spain. So when the Czech invasion came, the PCE leadership--which was located in Czechoslovakia and working closely with Dubcek--could easily conjure up visions of secret GPU prisons and kidnappings of political leaders should it get into office in Spain as a vassal of Moscow. The Kremlin even shut down Radio Free Spain during the Czech invasion. Thus the PCE denunciation of the overthrow of the Dubcek government was much more than a pacifying gesture to avoid losing members but a declaration of fundamental opposition.

Furthermore, it immediately provoked a faction fight inside the PCE, in which the pro-Moscow opposition (first Eduardo García, then Enrique Lister) received the tacit approval of the Kremlin (holding several-hundred-person anti-Carrillo meetings and distributing leaflets against the PCE leadership in Moscow). Although the numbers were small, it must be remembered that the PCE at this time was an emigré party whose political life took place essentially among a few thousand exiles in Paris, Prague and Moscow. Moreover, after the fight was over and Carrillo emerged victorious, the Soviet bloc periodically went out of its way to embarrass the PCE, such as the Polish delivery of coal at the height of the 1971 Asturian miners strike (see Fernando Claudin, "The Split in the Spanish Communist Party," New Left Review, No. 70, November-December 1971 for an account of this fight).

By 1971, therefore, Carrillo had already fought out a bitter faction fight against explicitly Moscow-backed oppositionists in the PCE central committee over a major issue of Soviet foreign policy, leading to the expulsion of the Kremlin loyalists. This was the only one of the future Eurocommunist parties in which such a split took place. In discussing the conditions under which a Stalinist party could pass over to social democracy we had previously assumed that a much larger split would be necessary. However, the PCE was not a mass party; the supporters of García and Lister constituted a big dent in the party cadre. In hindsight, for the PCE the 1968 Czech invasion was the turning point after which there is a split, and then it is basically a question of time until the break is formalized--i.e., the Seymour schema (minus the overemphasis on the generational shift in loyalties) is approximately correct in the case of the PCE.

The trajectories of the PCF and PCI are not identical to that of Carrillo's party. For one thing, the PCE leadership has been actively looking for a break for a long time. Thus it convoked the March 1977 "Eurocommunist summit" and strove to obtain a joint declaration

against political repression in the USSR and East Europe. Knowing that this would be a direct challenge to Moscow leading to a split, the PCF and PCI leaders refused and even made reference to a "positive balance" in the satellites (Marchais) and the "great conquests" of the USSR (Berlinguer). In contrast, Carrillo's book, which had just appeared, characterized the Soviet Union as "socialist totalitarianism" with "formal features similar to the fascist dictatorships" (Eurocommunism and the State). |

Carrillo's tract is the only attempt to formalize a Eurocommunist doctrine and is interesting to the extent that it systematically and explicitly renounces Leninism in favor of consistent social-democratic reformism. It rejects the Leninist vanguard party and What Is To Be Done? It rejects the dictatorship of the proletariat and State and Revolution. It calls for gradually transforming the capitalist state, questions whether there is anything socialist about the USSR and says that the division between social democrats and Communists should be overcome. The only thing missing was the explicit rejection of "Marxism-Leninism"--the Stalinist codeword for its deformation of authentic Leninist communism--which, however, came a few months later on Carrillo's American tour.

While their actual practice is of course a flagrant repudiation of everything Lenin stood for, the Italian and French CPs have carefully avoided formally renouncing "Marxism-Leninism"--understanding that to do so would force a break with Moscow. In fact when some of the more adventurous right-wingers in the PCI floated this idea last fall, Berlinguer quickly intervened to squelch the idea. Only the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" has been formally dropped by all the Eurocommunists, as also by the Kremlin-loyal Cunhal and with Moscow's explicit approval (Stalin himself approved this explicit revisionism when the term "peoples democracies" was introduced in the late 1940's).

We wrote in "Spanish CP Goes 'Eurocommunist'" (WV No. 205, 12 May 1978) that the adoption of thesis 15--renouncing "Marxism-Leninism"--by the PCE's Ninth Congress formalized the break of Carrillo's party with Stalinism. Does this mean that Stalinist parties are defined by their program? In the case of small left tendencies a Stalinist formation can be characterized essentially on the basis of program--in the same sense that they can be considered part of the workers movement irrespective of whether they have support in the working class--such as support for a particular deformed workers state or even, in some cases, their support for bureaucratic rule on the basis of proletarian property forms. But a mass party is more than just program: it must be characterized by its relation to the working class, to the bourgeoisie and to the Stalinist bureaucracies.

The PCE's renunciation of "Marxism-Leninism" was a formal break with the Soviet bureaucracy because it rejected the very basis on which the USSR was founded, and also because Moscow had warned in advance that this was a revision which could not be tolerated. The CPSU said as much in its greetings to the congress, and it was over this issue that the Carrillo leadership of the PCE sought to have its



Eurocommunist program formally endorsed by the party. If there was no split at the congress itself to mark the break from Stalinism, it is in part because the pro-Moscow hardliners had long since split with Lister and García (with more than 95 percent of the party membership recruited since then); and in addition there are possibilities of splits by anti-Carrillo elements in the wake of the Ninth Congress. Thus the evolution of the PCE confirms, I believe, the criteria laid out above for judging the definitive social-democratization of the Stalinist parties of West Europe.

Santiago Carrillo's decision to break with Moscow was taken long before the Ninth Congress. He had already burned his bridges behind him, and come what may he could never again be the Kremlin's man. Thus as a committed reformist betrayer of the working class Carrillo aggressively played his only option: seeking to demonstrate his reliability not simply to capitalism but even to defense of the Francoist monarchy. When the PCE received a dismal 9 percent in the 15 June 1977 elections to the Cortes, the party leadership did not even bother to analyze the causes and simply went ahead pledging their unconditional support to King Juan Carlos and his prime minister Suárez. They had made their irrevocable choice. When the French PCF, in contrast, saw its electoral base threatened by the bourgeoisie and the Socialists it pulled back to a more traditional Stalinist posture.

\* \* \* \* \*

The present document is essentially a reply to general questions concerning Eurocommunism raised by the Seymour document "Notes on Eurocommunism" as well as in discussions among members of the Interim Secretariat and the WV Ed Board on the subject; and an analysis of the evolution of the Spanish PCE pointing to the conclusion, published in WV No. 205, that its Ninth Congress marked the point at which Carrillo's party formally broke with Stalinism. An additional text would be necessary to give a more concrete analysis of the course of the Italian and French CPs, and a general discussion of the development of Eurocommunism.

Concerning the Samuels document of 4 June, it is incorrect to depict Eurocommunism as arising essentially out of an examination of the lessons of Chile and Portugal by the CP bureaucrats. The Chilean CP also concluded that the UP had gone too far and that Allende was too left, but they hardly became Eurocommunists. The appearance of "Eurocommunism" was the direct result of the opening up of possibilities of CP participation in governments in southern Europe--in turn a by-product of détente. The sudden dramatic PCF support for Soviet dissident Plyushch, in particular, was an attempt to win middle-class votes by attacking Kremlin repression. (And when the PCF electoral possibilities dimmed in 1978 it suppressed a brochure with a picture of Plyushch and of Soviet tanks in Prague, at a cost of over \$500,000.) Also, while the reluctance of the PCF and PCI to formally break from the Kremlin is largely due to diplomatic considerations rather than real loyalties, it is too early to conclude that they are no longer Stalinist.

In this respect I agree with Seymour's characterization of the French and Italian CPs, in his "Draft Resolutions on Eurocommunism," as dissident allies of the Soviet bureaucracy. I do not agree, however, that the PCI's full entry into the government would likely provoke either a split or a decisive break with Moscow. It would take a major event in which the Italian bourgeoisie opposes the Soviet Union to provoke the formal split which the PCI has carefully avoided for almost two decades. For the moment, Moscow would like to see the PCI in the government.

On the Sharpe document, "Notes on the Crisis of Stalinism," applying the label "Eurocommunist" to the Yugoslav or Rumanian "parties" is based on a confusion concerning the nature of Stalinism. For all its inadequacies, the journalistic term Eurocommunism refers to parties in the process of social-democratization, i.e., of making unconditional their support to their "own" bourgeoisie by removing the potential contradiction posed by formal loyalties to a degenerated workers state. The Yugoslav and Rumanian bureaucracies have their own deformed workers states to leech off of and thus must necessarily be Stalinist, albeit national Stalinists (a term incorrectly equated with the Eurocommunist CPs) as were the Dubcek reformers in Czechoslovakia.

--5 June 1978